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ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction: 
'Loke smin dvividha nistha pura prokta maya nagha' 
' Jnanayogena sankhyanam karmayogena yoginam' 
"Bhagavad-Gita, 3.3" 
"In this world a two-fold underpinning (of spiritual salvation) has been 
expounded by Me of old; by the discipline of knowledge of the followers of 
Samkhya, and by the discipline of action of the followers of Yoga" (Edgerton, 
1924). 
Samkhya philosophy is frequently said to be the oldest of the main systems of 
Indian philosophy. It is not always obvious, however, what this claim amounts 
to (Burley, 2007). The references to what appear as the Samkhya doctrine are 
found in the Upanishads, particularly in the later ones among them. But while 
some are of opinion that the system is independent in origin and almost as old 
as the Upanishads, others uphold that it is a derivative teachings of those 
ancient treatises. There is indeed a reference in one of the Upanishads to 
Maharishi Kapila, the supposed founder of the Samkhya philosophy accordmg 
to tradition (Hiriyanna, 1993). Relatively a few references to Samkhya can be 
found in the Mahabharata as well. Negotiations of Samkhya in the 
Mahabharata can primarily be found in three places; the Bhagavad-Gita, the 
Anugita of the Asvamedhikaparvan, and the Moksadharma section of the 
Santiparvan. However the textual history of hefty portions of the Mahabharata 
is still not completely clear, the Bhagavad-Gita is most likely the earliest of all 
of these (Brockington, 1998). Samkhya philosophy is intimately associated 
with the Yoga system of spiritual development. Although this tradition is 
ancient, its basic text is the Samkhya Karika of Isvarakrsna (400-500 A.D) 
upon which there are commentaries including the Yuktidipika (650 A.D) and 
the Tattvakaumudi by Vacaspati Misra (841 or 976 A.D) (Bartley, 2011). 
INTRODUCTION 
Samkhya system confesses dualism of two all-pervasive ultimate principles, 
namely; pure consciousness (purusa), construed pluralistically, and one 
primordial materiality (prakrti) (Larson and Bhattacharya, Vol. (IV), 1987). 
Samkhya is an inflexible dualism merged pluralistic spiritualism and atheistic 
realism. At the same time, as regards causation Samkhya believes in 
satkaryavada, according to which effect pre-exists in cause. Samkhya also 
advocates a theory of evolution according to which the whole world is the 
resultant effect of the proximity of prakrti and purusa. The proximity among 
these two ultimate realities disturbs the state of equilibrium that exists amid the 
gunas of prakrti and gives rise to evolution. Moreover, Samkhya believes that 
bondage and liberation are merely phenomenal. It is only the ego, the product 
of prakrti, which is bound. Therefore, it is the ego that is liberated (Srinivas and 
Sastry, 2007). 
In some contexts the Samkhya methodology implies a monistic viewpoint, in 
others a theistic perspective. Throughout the era, however, a typical 
terminology and a recurrent set of intellectual issues begin to develop around 
the methodology: reflections concerning to primal matter (pradhana); 
enumerations of psychic states or conditions (bhavas) that can be construed 
psychologically and or cosmologically; analysis of the different aspects of 
intellectual experience in terms of intellect (buddhi), egoity (ahamkara) and 
mind (manas); speculations about the nature of the inner self (purusa) in terms 
of a cosmic self (atman) or the self in the body or in the manifested world (jiva, 
bhutatman); elaborations of the five sense abilities (indriya) correlated with the 
five gross elements (bhuta), the five action capacities (karmendriya), and the 
five contents or objects (visaya) of the senses; and a universal polarity among 
subjectivity and objectivity in terms of 'the knower of the field' and 'the field' 
Accordingly, primordial materiality (prakrti) is made up of three constituent 
processes (gunas), i.e., intelligibility (sattva), activity (rajas), and inertia 
(tamas) (Larson and Bhattacharya, Vol. (IV), 1987). 
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The philosophy of these gunas is very profound. From the evidence of the 
Yuktidipika it may be stated that they are infra-atomic quanta of reals, rather 
forces than substance. Speaking of their characteristic features the Yogabhasya 
states that they are always in a state of flux. Their changing permutations and 
combinations give rise to all sorts of collocations which are manifested in the 
world of objects. But really speaking, all these manifested objects do not 
basically fluctuate from the gunas from which they emerge for the simple 
reason that Samkhya sternly maintains the view that the cause is immanant in 
its effect. Although, the manifested objects only appear to our experience while 
the substratum whose manifestations are these objects of the perceptible world 
always remains outside the range of perception. In this connection the author of 
the Yogabhasya quotes a verse where in it is stated that the gunas in their real 
forms do not come within optical range; what comes within the range of vision 
is appearance like maya. From this it follows that the gunas in their original 
forms are very subtle while it is their effects only that become manifested. 
Likewise, the Yuktidipika also is found to state in one place that even the sacred 
sage Kapila can experience the effects of the gunas only and not the gunas 
themselves in their potential state for the simple reason that they in that state 
remains invisible (Chakravarti, 1951). 
Subsequently, the Samkhya philosophy claims our first and chief attention, 
because it unaccompanied attempts to solve its problems solely by the means of 
reason. The authentically philosophical spirit in which its method is 
manipulated of rising from the known factors of experience to the unknown by 
the path of logical demonstration, thus to reach a knowledge of the ultimate 
cause, is acknowledged with approbation by all inquirers who have gravely 
occupied themselves with this system (Garbe, 1897). Hence, the Samkhya 
philosophy of Kapila was the first rational system that the world ever saw. 
Therefore, every metaphysician in the world must pay reverence to him 
(Tapasyananda, September 1984). 
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I have penned down this dissertation into four chapters excluding references 
and bibliography. An attempt has been made in the T^  chapter, to trace the 
origin of the Samkhya philosophy and their development which the system 
underwent in the different stages of its escalation and evolution. However, I 
have spared no pains to present the picture of early Samkhya philosophy and 
their general views. In the chapter T^ I have discussed Samkhya metaphysics, 
dualism, epistemology, liberation, and God and ethics. In the 3"^** chapter I have 
examined theory of gunas in the Samkhya philosophy, roughly speaking that, I 
have furnished comprehensive descriptions of sattva, rajas and tamas. I have 
also discussed the relationship between gunas and prakrti, and the impact of 
gunas in evolution, and the evolutes in this very chapter. And in the chapter 4' 
I gave critical appraisal and conclude the dissertation. In spite of this I have 
discussed many more things philosophically in this dissertation. 
Hence, the purpose of this dissertation is to bring to light on the theory of gunas 
to find out new dimensions. My key endeavour in this work is, to give a clear, 
comprehensive and critical account (analysis). To make it possible, I have 
examined the original sources of the Samkhya philosophy as well as their 
enriched literature, such as Samkhya Karika of Isvarakrsna and Vacaspati 
Misra's Tattvakaumudi etc. 
Samkhya Philosophy: 
A Generic View 
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CHAPTER-1 
Samkhya Philosophy: A Generic View: 
It is impractical to inscribe a history of Indian philosophy on the replica of the 
history of western philosophy. Extremely, diminutive is recognized about the 
philosophers of India. And, it is unfeasible to say which philosophy came 
earlier and which later. In fact, the philosophies in India did not appear one 
after another; they developed alongside one another (Mahadevan, 1974). 
Among all the Indian Philosophical systems, the Samkhya Philosophy is 
measured to be the earliest schools of thought. Samkhya Philosophy maintains 
an outstanding position in all the Sastras while it is either breached or 
supported by every other Philosophical system. Sankaracarya says; Samkhya 
doctrine, more ever, stands fairly close to the Vedanta doctrine since like the 
latter, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect, and is, furthermore, has 
been acknowledged by some of the authors of the Dharma Sutras, such as 
Devala and so on (Virupakshanada, November 1995). 
Samkhya is one of the six orthodox Brahminical Hindu systems of salvation or 
'visions' (darshana) (Bartley, 2011), frequently connected with the Yoga 
tradition (Bartley, 2005). In the Mahabharata it is said that there is no 
knowledge such as Samkhya and no supremacy like that of Yoga. We should 
have no doubt as to Samkhya being the premier knowledge. Again in the 
Mahabharata and Puranas we find the Samkhya Philosophy fully explained. 
Those who desire to discern details of references to Samkhya are requested to 
confer with the detailed introduction of Samkhya by Jha, Mahamahopadhyaya 
Ganganath (Virupakshanada, November 1995). 
Ghosh Jajneshwar, wrote a book for his guru, Aranya, Swami Hariharananda 
(first published in 1936, and reissued in 1977), that Ghosh begins to enlarge 
further thoughtful and sophisticated expressions of Samkhya philosophy. He 
stresses the phenomenological nature of the metaphysical representation. He 
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describes Samkhyites methodology as one of 'logical reflection' 'which is 
brought to tolerate mainly on the stuffing of consciousness' and which involves 
'no grand leap from thought to things in themselves'; so as to be, no pledge to 
the existence of empirical objects in parallel of experience itself 
Time is generally depicted in Indian mythology as the immense manufacturer 
and the immense demolisher. It devours the whole thing that it has earlier 
emitted. This equivalence is extremely pertinent when it comes to the historical 
survey of pre-modem India, and with regard to philosophical traditions of 
Samkhya, time has surely eaten up the source equipments that would be 
requisite to disembark at everything yet slightly approaching an articulate 
image of their historical progress. Numerous studies subsist on the histories of 
Samkhya and Yoga, a number of which are portions of works that put to cover 
up Indian philosophy in its whole and others of which attend more rarely to 
Samkhya. The genealogical variety of proto-Samkhyan themes and facts can be 
traced further back in the ancient documentary record and most predominantly 
in the sort of manuscript recognized as major Upanishads than can any of the 
erstwhile schools of Indian philosophy. An amount of themes and facts 
distinctive of Samkhya and Yoga are apparent in early text of Upanishads such 
as the Chandogya, Brhadaranyaka, Aitareya and Kausitaki and that these facts 
sustained to develop until, in the metrical Upanishads, most especially the 
Katha and svetasvatara (both 500-200 BC according to criterion estimates), 
they 'emerged from the womb' as an individual philosophical point of view 
(Buriey, 2007). 
I found also references to the Samkhya doctrine in the Prasna- Upanishads, in 
the Mahabharata, in the Bhagavad-Gita, in Smrtis and in the Puranas. 
Badarayana, the author of the Vedanta-Sutra, frequently analysis whether the 
Samkhya can be regarded as the teaching of the Upanishads and discards it, 
further endeavours denunciation of the Samkhya in the Tarkapada on logical 
arguments. Shankaracharya regards it as the 'chief opponent' (pradhanamalla) 
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of Vedanta and says that even if Samkhya is commonly accepted by the shrewd 
as favourable to the premier good, however these systems advocate dualism 
and cannot be supported by the Shruti. Actually the Badarayana and Shankara, 
are eager to refuse the analysis that Samkhya, although acknowledged by the 
wise, is not based on the Upanishads because it advocates dualism, suggests 
that there must have been some thinkers belonging to the Samkhya who 
claimed it to be the teachings of the Upanishads. While nothing can be 
assumed with complete conviction, it seems extremely feasible that the 
Samkhya in the commencement was based on the Upanishads and had 
established the theistic utter however later on beneath persuade of the Jaina and 
the Buddhist thought, it discarded theistic monism and was pleased with 
spiritualistic pluralism and theistic realism. And it is this Samkhya to which 
Badarayana and Shankara are opposed. This furthermore explains why several 
of the later Samkhya, for instance Vijnanabhiksu in the sixteenth century, tried 
to perk up earlier theism in Samkhya (Sharma, 1960). 
Samkhya is believed to have been founded by a semi-mythical sanctified man 
"Kapila", who stands exterior to the traditional congregation of the Vedic samts 
and sages, as an enlightened one in his own right. Although he acts no such 
prominent role in Indian myth and legend as do loads of the other great 
philosophers, nonetheless, his marvellous authority is known, in a renowned 
episode of the Mahabharata. Kapila is a description of the sun, as well as visnu 
(Zimmer, September 1951). In verse sixty nine of the Samkhya Kahka, 
Isvarakrsna indicates that the Samkhya system has been completely 
enumerated or explained by the "supreme sage" (paramarsi), who is generally 
recognized within the Samkhya tradition as the sage Kapila. According to the 
oldest commentary on the Karika (Paramartha's Chinese translation), Kapila is 
an 'intelligent Spartan', 'bom of paradise, 'naturally gifted with the four basic 
predispositions of virtue, knowledge, renunciation, and supernatural power' 
(Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987). It is known that he was bom at Puskara, and 
that he took residence at Gangasagara. It is surmised that Kapila-Vastu, the city 
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to which prince Siddhartha who became the Buddha belonged, was founded 
underneath motivation of the sage Kapila (Mahadevan, 1974). In the 
Svetasvatara Upanishads, the word 'Samkhya' and 'Kapila' have been used for 
the first time (Virupakshanada, November 1995). The word 'Kapila' literally 
means glowing brown in colour, and it is frequently recommended that it is in 
this sense, not in reference to a personage, that the early instances of the word 
were anticipated. The verse appears in an account of "the one who rules over 
both knowledge and ignorance". It is said this one "alone presides over womb 
after womb, and thus over all perceptible forms and all the sources of birth; 
who in the beginning carried this Kapila bom of the seer together with his body 
of knowledge and would look on him as he was being bom (Patrick, 1998). 
Some states that he is the grandson of Brahma, others that he is an avatar of 
visnu, still others recognize him with manifestation of Agni. Although these 
accounts are mythological, it may be established that a historical entity of the 
name of Kapila was accountable for the Samkhya inclination of thought. I shall 
not be erroneous if I set him in the century prior to the Buddha (Radhakrislman, 
Vol.2, 1923). The Bhagavata Purana also presents Kapila as an avatara, but 
this is within a solely Vaisnava perspective. On the other hand, this alliance of 
Kapila with Visnu did not instigate with the Bhagavata Purana and can be 
initiates in an amount of other sources. Some Purana, recognize Kapila as an 
avatara, most remarkably the Visnu Purana which, as has been noted, was a 
major source for the Bhagavata. The Visnu Purana states that 'the Rsi Kapila is 
a scrap of the strong and universal Visnu, who has come down upon the earth 
to scatter illusion' (Wilson, 2002). 
In the Baudhayana Dharmasutra it is at least patent that a personage of some 
sort is being described. It describes the genesis of the some sort of renunciation 
tradition as deriving from the knowledge of someone named Kapila, the son of 
Prahlada (Patrick, 1993). Various facts regarding sage Kapila's life are 
described in Book Three of the Bhagavata Purana, where it is mentioned that 
his parents were Kardama Muni and Devahuti (www.mygum.m/The 
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Maharishi-Kapila.htm). I have founded that, there are various references to 
Kapila in the Mahabharata, majority of them in the Santiparvan. It is very 
patent all through that Kapila is not merely a man who has worked out a 
principally brilliant philosophy. He is a godly form and he is recognized with 
an assortment of different gods. For example, at one summit Kapila is 
described in terms that appear to be fairly human, but subsequently is 
recognized as Prajapati, "there was one personage amid the seers who, they 
say, avoided the physical pleasures of men whereas searching for that ultimate, 
eternal bliss so hard to attain, the Samkhya followers call him Kapila, as well 
as Prajapati, the highest seer" (Wynee, 2009). Kapila is also mentioned by 
Krishna in the Bhagavad-Gita; "Of all trees I am the banyan tree, and of the 
sages amid the demigods I am Narada. Of the Gandharvas I am Citraratha, and 
amid perfected beings I am the sage Kapila" (www.myguru.in /the maharishi-
Kapila.htm). 
Kapila, who, in a rationalistic way, saw only the assortment, but not the unity 
of the cosmos (Garbe, 1897). Kapila said, "Acts merely purify the body. 
Knowledge, however, is the utmost end (for which one strives). When all faults 
of the heart are cured (by acts) and when the felicity of Brahma becomes 
conventional in knowledge, kindness, mercy, equanimity, sympathy, honesty, 
and frankness, abstaining from grievance, nonappearance of conceit, 
diffidence, abandonment, and abstaining from work are attained. These 
compose the trail that escort to Brahma. By those one attains to what is the 
Highest" (Book 12, Santi Parva: Mokshadharma Parva, Section CCLXX). 
Kapila might have lived prior to Buddha and authored the prominent Samkhya-
Sutra. Isvarakrsna (fifth century CE) is the summariser of the Samkhya 
tradition (Srinivas, and Sastry, 2007). The references to Samkhya Sutras are 
found in the Vedas (Virupakshanada, November 1995). 
The sacred Kapila was the first to identify the Truth as he was the first sage 
who had a lucid understanding of the doctrine of purusa in his segregation or 
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distant from the constituents of the phenomenal world. He is called, indeed, 
Kapila by the Samkhyas and Hiranyagarbha by the Yogas (Ghosh, 1997). His 
Siddhi or rightness is regarded as an illustration of what is called Janma-Siddhi, 
that is, he was gifted with rightness from the very instant of his birth 
(Chakravarti, 1951). 
Samkhya Sutra being extremely concise and snappy, Kapila we are told, wrote 
detailed work entitled the Samkhyapravacanasutra. Consequently the Samkhya 
Philosophy is also identified as 'atheistic Samkhya' (Nirisvara-Samkhya), as 
distinguished from Yoga which is called the 'theistic-Samkhya' (Sesvara-
Samkhya). The cause for this is that Kapila did not confess the existence of 
God and also thought that God's existence could not be proved (Chatterjee and 
Datta, 2007). As regards the identity of the writer, as moreover the antiquity of 
the Samkhyapravacanasutra otherwise recognized as Sutra Sadadhyayi as also 
Tattvasamasa, both of which are ascribed to Kapila, severe doubt has been 
aroused by roughly all sections of scholars (Chattopadhyaya, 1978). But 
Samkhyapravachanasutra which ascribed to Kapila nonnally regarded by 
scholars as a work of the fourteenth century A.D., as it has not been referred to 
by the earlier writers of the other schools, because it criticizes the opponent 
systems and because it desires to perk up theism. As a result theism is 
concerned; we preserve that the original Samkhya was theistic. Although the 
reality is that this work has been mistreated and Ishvarakrsna's Karika has been 
referred as a substitute by the other previous writers, while as the reality that it 
criticizes other systems go besides this work being regarded as that of Kapila 
himself (Sharma, 1960). 
The Samkhyapravacanasutra, ascribed to Kapila has six chapters, of which the 
first three are dedicated to an elucidation of the Samkhya principles, the fourth 
gives various descriptive stories, the fifth refutes adversary views, and the sixth 
winds up with a recapitulation, mainly on the ground that Madhava's 
Sarvadarsanasamgraha does not consign to it, but bases its account of the 
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Samkhya on the Karika. Though the Karika develops a stringent dualism, the 
Sutra shows a more appeasing approach towards theistic monism. Aniruddha's 
Samkhyasutravrtti belongs to the fifteenth century, while Mahadeva's 
Samkhyasutravrttisara is said to have been written about 1600 AD. Nagesa's 
Laghusamkhyasutravrtti is not of much worth. The main significant work on 
the Samkhyapravacanasutra is Vijnanabhiksu's Samkhyapravacanabhasya 
(sixteenth century). This writer accomplishes to reduce the difference among 
the Samkhya and the theistic Vedanta, which he regards as the authentic 
Vedanta, whereas the Advaita Vedanta is its contemporary distortion 
(Radhakrishnan, Vol.2, 1923). 
Samkhya-Sutra is the foundation of Samkhya system while later on numerous 
couplets were added to it. Kapila is thought to be the fifth personification of 
Visnu in the Bhagvata of the various Scholars who devoted themselves to the 
study of this school of thought; the most renowned is Vijnanabhiksu (Sharma, 
2006,). The Samkhya sutras which are handed down beneath the name of 
Kapila are perceptibly an invention of a later era. A second Sutra Text the so 
called Tattvasamasa (summary of truth) might have arisen in a prior era 
(Frauwallner, 1973). Samkhya Sutra is a work of extreme larger length than the 
Tattvasamasasutra, and of the Samkhya Karika as well. The 
Tattvasamasasutra is an inclined work, comprising a mere twenty-five sutras, 
the last of which is generally consider to have been added by the mysterious 
author of the commentary called the Kramadipika (late fourteenth century). 
The sutras are extremely compressed, most of them consisting of just two or 
three words. They amount to modest more than subheadings, the implications 
of which are missing for commentators to cram in. While extended and 
interpreted by the Kramadipika, and also by later commentaries such as the 
Tattvayatharthyadipana of Bhavaganesa (late sixteenth century), the 
Tattvasamasasutra offers nothing that drastically differentiates its description 
of Samkhya from that of Isvarakrsna. Samkhya-Sutra comprises a total of 527 
sutras and large amount of its content is of important philosophical 
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significance. In the Samkhya Sutra itself there are symbols that it may have 
been tranquil in firaction to reveal Samkhya's traditional values with key 
utterances from the Upanishads. In pre-classical texts, overlie among 
'Samkhyan' and 'Vedantic' doctrines had possibly been mainly due to the 
elevated level of intangible and terminological variability that existed in those 
eras. Subsequently came the classical era, throughout which the distinctions 
among philosophical viewpoints were sharpened, moreover now, with the 
Samkhya Sutra and some other post-classical works, there seems to be a 
progress to fetch Samkhya and Yoga into more palpable consensus with Sruti, 
that is, the heard or exposed ejaculations of the Upanisadic or, more roughly, 
Brahmanic tradition (Burley, 2007). Unique concentration has been drawn to 
the petite area, called the Tattvasamasa, by reason of the fact that Max MuUer 
measured that it was the actual text book of the Samkhya system anterior of the 
Samkhya Karika (Keith, 1975). Tattvasamasa does not include any incessant 
line of argumentation. It is nothing more, in fact, than a list of technical terms 
alienated into twenty-two (or twenty-five) sutras (Hulin, 1978). 
The Samkhya Sutra was not referred to by any author until it was commented 
upon by Aniruddha (15* century A.D.). Even Gunaratna of the 14* century 
A.D., who made allusions to an amount of Samkhya works, did not make any 
reference to the Samkhya Sutra and no other author who is identified to have 
flourished prior to Gunaratna seems to have made any reference to the 
Samkhya Sutra. The normal end thus is that these Sutras were perhaps written 
some time after the 14* century. But there is no point confirmation to provide 
evidence that it was so late a work as the 15* century_(Dasgupta, 1922). While 
concerns the chief doctrines of the system, the Samkhya Sutra is comfortable 
with introducing a few technical perfections. They, for example, furnish more 
interest to the method in which the amalgamation of nature and spirit takes 
place. They strive to show that the buddhi constitutes the merely probable 
"place" for that amalgamation. On the other hand, the Samkhya Sutra laid 
enhanced stress on what constitutes the unique nature of the Samkhya. This 
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leads to a condemnation of basically all other systems of Indian philosophy. 
The entire text of the Samkhya Sutra is filled over with polemics. When such, it 
contrasts very much with the Samkhya Karika, where each type of polemics 
was intentionally avoided. The Samkhya Sutra, for example, emphasizes that 
'atheism' which was only vaguely sketched out in the Samkhya Karika (if not 
in their commentaries). At the same time, nevertheless, the Samkhya Sutra 
appears as intensely predisposed by the very doctrines on which they are debut 
their attacks. This is particularly accurate of their association to the Vedanta. 
Erstwhile, the Samkhya Sutra spares no efforts to settle their central teachings 
with the statements of the Vedas and Upanishads (Hulin, 1978). The Sutra 
furthermore includes many points which the Karika leaves out as unnecessary 
(Keith, 1975). But Kapila's work was unfortimately mislaid long ago (Sharma, 
1960). 
Salute to that Kapila by whom the Samkhya philosophy was thoughtfully 
imparted, to provide as a boat for the purpose of voyage the ocean of ignorance 
in which the world was absorbed (Colebrooke, 1837). While regards his, 
historicity, various Scholars embrace diverse viewpoints which have not been 
dealt with here. Although, usually, it is thought that Kapila was the initiator of 
the Samkhya system of thought. Kapila had a pupil by name Asuri. Asuri's 
pupil was Pancasikha (Virupakshanada, November 1995). In verse seventy of 
the Karika; Isvarakrsna informs us that out of compassion Kapila transmitted 
the knowledge of Samkhya to Asuri who in turn conceded on the system to 
Pancasikha (Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987). Including these there are twenty 
six names of Samkhya teachers, are met in the Smrtis, the Mahabharata and 
the Karikas etc. They are as follows: 
(1) Kapila, (2) Asuri, (3) Pancasikha, (4) Vindhyavasa, or Vindhyavasaka or 
Vindhyavasin, (5) Varsagnya, (6) Jaigisavya, (7) Vodhu, (8) Asitadevala or 
Devala, (9) Sanaka, (10) Sanandana, (U) Sanatana, (12) Sanatkumara, (13) 
Bhrgu, (14) Sukra, (15) Kasyapa, (16) Parasara, (17) Garga or Gargya, (18) 
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Gautama, (19) Narada, (20) Arstisena, (21) Agastya, (22) Pulastya, (23) Harita, 
(24) Uluka, (25) Valmiki and (26) Suka (Jha, 1965). No doubt the canonical 
record isncludes twenty six names, but seven of these sages benefit from 
chiefly elevated status. They are considered to be 'sacred sons of Brahma' and 
must be daily invocated by Brahmins during the so called 'oblation ritual to the 
sages' (rsitarpana). They are, according to Gaudapada; Kapila, Asuri, 
Pancasikha, Vodhu, Sanaka, Sanandana and Sanatana. The last three are, 
beyond doubt, mere mythological figures. While nothing is known about 
Vodhu, Pancasikha ought to be a historical being. In addition, the analysed 
Pancasikhavakya, the various references to him found in the Yogasutrabhasya 
'undoubtedly signify a teacher emphasizing the yogic aspect of Samkhya-
Yoga. It might, nevertheless, be safer to wind up in errand of the existence of 
numerous Pancasikhas, as, in other parts of the Moksadharma, fairly diverse 
and still ambiguous doctrines are accredited to that very same person (Hulin, 
1978). 
Kapila, who was the first to understand the Truth (that is essential for freedom) 
and was thus accounted the supreme of sages, communicated the science (about 
the origin of bondage and liberation) out of concern to probing Asuri, with a 
fresh constructed intellect (for the reason). Asuri who inward utmost 
knowledge unswervingly from the first expositor of it as the moon receives its 
luminosity from the sun and was thus known as the organizer of the shrewd and 
the preceptor of the giand school of the Samkhya. Pancasikha, the writer of the 
Samkhya aphorisms, who had a different and specific indulgent of the 
elementary values of the absolute principles of renunciation and was therefore 
with no doubts, bliss and pain are such contrarieties (Ghosh, 1997). 
In Mahabharata-XII, Pancasikha is said to be the direct pupil of Asuri. 
Pancasikha of course does not explain the system as highly as Caraka does. 
Although still what modest he says it may be hypothetical that the system of 
Samkhya he sketches is the similar as that of Caraka. Pancasikha speaks of the 
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ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term useful in all Samkhya literature to 
prakrti) in the state punisa (purusavasthamavyaktam) (Dasgupta, 1922). From 
the few fragmentary passages that have come down to us, Pancasikha held the 
theory of the three gunas. He regarded the purusas as minute in dimension, and 
accredited the association of purusa and prakrti to want of favouritism rather 
than to works (Radhakrishnan, Vol.2, 1923). 
Subsequent to him I found the name Vindhyavasa, next I find the name of 
» 
Varsaganya as a teacher of Samkhya. He is followed by Jaigisavya. According 
to some Scholars, Jaigisavya was a classmate of Pancasikha. In the list of 
names next we find Vodhu after that of Asuri and before that of Pancasikha. 
Then, the names Devala and Sanaka appear. He was bom in a Kausika family 
(Virupakshanada, November 1995). If the confirmation regarding these 
teachers is too perplexed and conflicting to allow us to rebuild the meticulous 
doctrine of each, it at least testifies to the affluence and multiplicity of the 
Samkhya thought in the era instantly foregoing the Samkhya Karika. The 
Samkhya Karikas present themselves as the summary of prior, more ample 
exposition, the Sastitantra, in their own words; 'the subjects which are treated 
in the seventy verses are, certainly, those of the intact science of sixty topics, 
elite of the descriptive tales and omitting also the debate of opponent view\ 
The Sastitantra seems to be lost. It is not even persuaded that it has ever been 
accessible in the form of a text, because oral quotations of it cannot be found in 
the earliest literature. Its authorship, besides, has been ascribed to a mystifying 
multiplicity of teachers (Pancasikha, Kapila, Varsaganya and so on). 
Sastitantra is probably 'a term for the Samkhya philosophy as a system of sixty 
principles' (Hulin, 1978). As Isvarakrsna himself speaks of Kapila, Asuri, and 
Pancashika, it seems feasible that these were historical personages whose 
works have been lost (Sharma, 1960). 
The Samkhya's fundamental text is the Samkhya Karika of Isvarakrsna (400-
500 BCE) upon which there are commentaries amid which are the Yuktidipika 
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(650 BCE) and Vachaspatimishra's Tattvakaumudi (841 or 976 BCE) (Bartley, 
2005). Isvarakrisna appears to be older than Vasubhandhu and the work of 
Isvarakrisna had seventy verses in it (Virupakshanada, November 1995). The 
literal meaning of the word of the Karika is 'the means of removing pain' (Jha, 
August 1965). Samkhya Karika otherwise recognized as Samkhya Saptati, 
Kanaka Saptati and Suvarna Saptati or Hiranya Saptati in its Chinese version 
(Chattopadhyaya, 1978). 
Isvarakrsna is the representative of the classical Samkhya which had removed 
itself from the Upanishads beneath the influence of Jainism and Buddhism; 
however the Vedantic teaching of totalitarianism with which the original 
Samkhya was connected, asserts itself utterly in Isvarakrsna. We have seen that 
totalitarianism is implicit in Jainism and explicit in Mahayana Buddhism and 
we shall see how it is implicit in Isvarakrsna also (Sharma, 1960). A large 
amount of research has been based on references to two famous Samkhya 
teachers that are said to have lived close to the period of Isvarakrsna, named 
respectively Varsaganya or Vrsagana and Vindhyavasa or Vindhyavasin. The 
earlier of these two is first mentioned in the Moksadharma (Mahabharata XII), 
while this is only as a name in a list of Samkhya teachers. Both individuals are 
mentioned in Paramartha's biography of the Buddhist teacher, Vasubandhu, 
with Vindhyavasa being represented as a pupil of Varsaganya. Somewhat 
afterwards Chinese source complicates matters by speaking of Varsaganya not 
as a meticulous individual but as the name of a group of supporters of Kapila 
headed by a man named Varsa (rain), so called due to his having been born 
during the rainy season. This account carries less authority, though, than a 
Sanskrit commentary on the Samkhya Karika called the Yuktidipika, which 
noticeably portrays Varsaganya, Vindhyavasin, and Isvarakrsna as three 
separate persons, each of whom has a little dissimilar viewpoint on Samkhya. 
Paramartha's biography of Vasubandhu does at least declares that Vindhyavasa 
lived nine hundred years after the death of the Buddha (the Buddha having 
died, according to current estimates, around 400 BCE), and that this same 
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Vindhyavasa studied under Vrsagaja's (Varsagajya's) guidance, thereby 
implying that the two men were contemporaries (Burley, 2007). Isvarakrsna 
also have been a contemporary of Kalidasa (Hiriyanna, 1993). 
The Samkhya Karika of Isvarakrsna is the earliest available as well as the most 
admired textbook of the Samkhya School. From its name, it is patent that it is 
not the first work of the system. A Chinese tradition ascribes to vindhyvasa the 
rewriting of a work by Varsagana. If Vindhyavasa is the same as the writer of 
the Karika it follows that the Karika was based on a prior work of which we 
have no information. It is a work of the third century A.D. Gaudapada wrote a 
commentary on the Karika. Whether this commentator is the same as the writer 
of the Karika on the Mandukyakarika cannot be determined, in view of the 
multiplicity of thought among the two works. As he is prior to Vacaspati, he 
may be assigned to the eighth century AD. Vacaspati's Samkhyacandrika is a 
discourse on the Karika (Radhakrishnan, Vol.2, 1923). Eight early 
commentaries on the Samkhya Karika are identified to have survived. There is 
some doubt about the chronological order of these, but one of the first, and 
conceivably the earliest of all, is a Chinese translation of the text with an 
associated Chinese commentary. It is fixed that the translation identified by the 
Sanskrit name Suvamasaptati (Golden seventy) was made by the Buddhist 
sage, Paramartha, around 557-569 BCE, though there is no consent of view on 
whether the commentary was authored by the translator or taken from an 
existing Sanskrit source. Whatsoever, the facts of the matter may be, 
knowledge of the approximate date of Paramartha's translafion has helped to 
locate a sequential border to the composition of the Samkhya Karika itself The 
two commentaries on the Samkhya Karika that linger to be mentioned here are 
the Jayamangala (not to be perplexed with a renowned commentary on the 
Kamasutra with the same title) and the Tattvakaumudi. The author of the first 
of these is not known, while he has been thought to be a Buddhist due to the 
insertion of a benedictory verse to the sage {muni) of the loka-uttara-vadins 
(which is the name of a Buddhist sect) (Burley, 2007). 
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The Karikas are written in the dry a metre. Shaping their accurate number has 
led to everlasting negotiations, since that number varies with the commentaries 
among sixty nine and seventy three. B. G. Tilak went yet so far as to 
reconstitute a Karika which he thought to be lost. The fame of the Samkhya 
Karika can be acceptable from the number of commentaries which have been 
written about them. Six of these commentaries are known to us and these are as 
under: 
(1) Paramartha's commentary of the Chinese version on the Samkhya Karika, 
(2) the Gaudapadabhasya, (3) the Matharavrtti, (4) the Jayamangala, (5) the 
Yuktidipika and (6) the Samkhyatattvakaumudi. The Buddhist monk 
Paramartha (499-569) is supposed to have brought the Samkhya Karika to 
China in A. D. 546 and translated them into Chinese during the subsequent 
years (557-569). In spite of its name Suvamasaptati (the Gold Seventy), this 
description includes seventy one verses. It in fact does commentary on Karika-
72 (according to the numbering of other commentaries) but drops Karika-63. 
This commentary is extremely easy. It seems to have been written particularly 
for the use of beginners. The Gaudapadabhasya, generally admired text, is the 
model commentary on the Samkhya Karika. It is undoubtedly written, in simple 
language, without any reference to technicalities. The awful fact that it contains 
no reference to any other commentary speaks well for its relatively earliest 
time. For the sake of understanding, though, the entire set of the Karikas can be 
separated into the following items: 
(I) The basic problem (Karika 1-3), (2) the means of right knowledge 
(Pramana) (Karika 4-7), (3) the theory of causality (Karika 8-11), (4) the 
Gunas (Karika 12-13), (5) the un-manifested (avyakta) (Karika 14-16), (6) the 
Spirit (Karika 17-19), (7) the amalgamation of Nature and Spirit (Karika 20-
21), (8) the development of creation (Karika 22-38), (9) the subtle body 
(Karika 39-45), (10) positive and negative dispositions (bhava) (Karika 46-51), 
(II) cosmological descriptions (Karika 52-54), (12) defmiteness of the 
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development of creation (Karika 55-59), (13) the development chief freedom 
(Karika 60-68), (14) epilogue (Karika 69-72). The counterfeit group of Karika 
46-51 comprise a comprehensive list of dispositions (bhava). Their entire 
number is fifty; five varieties of error (viparyaya), twenty eight varieties of 
frailty (asakti), nine varieties of contentment (tusti) and eight varieties of 
achievement siddhi (Hulin, 1978). 
The Samkhya Karika observes that philosophical investigation originates in the 
desire to set an end to misery which is generally classed under three heads. And 
the Samkhya Sutras states the similar thing in a different way when they 
describe the Summum Bonum as eternal end of this threefold misery and point 
out that the means normally adopted are fairly irregular to such an end. 
Consequently there is no room for doubt or disparity of belief regarding the 
guiding doctrines of Samkhya (Ghosh, 1997). By means of the Samkhya 
Karika we appear from the province of speculation and distrust, and arrive at 
the classic statement of the doctrine of the Samkhya philosophy. It is 
admittedly by far the most luminous account of the system (Keith, 1975). 
Samkhya Karika forms the foundation of all contemporary interpretations of 
this Philosophical system (Sharma, 2006). 
After having got good opportunity to go through various books and sources on 
Samkhya for my dissertation I found that, there are numerous commentaries on 
the Samkhya Karika, including one by Gaudapada (perhaps unlike from the 
Advaita teacher who wrote the Mandukhya Karika) (Mahadevan, 1974). If one 
accepts the identity of Gaudapada the Samkhya author with the early Vedantin 
Gaudapada of the Mandukya Karika, after that one gains a firm verification for 
the recommended dating approximately 500 CE or shortly subsequently, for 
there is currently a universal consent that the Vedantin Gaudapada is to be 
dated about 500 of the Common Era (based upon the Mandukya Karika, cited 
in Bhavaviveka's Tarkajvala, which was composed towards the middle of the 
sixth century). The opinions in favour of and convict for identifying the two 
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Gaudapadas are not mainly strong on either side. The arguments against 
identity are basically two; (1) the philosophical views of the two Gaudapadas 
are undoubtedly diverse and (II) the Gaudapada of the Samkhyakarikabhasya 
does not emerge to have die philosophical depdi of the Gaudapada of the 
Mandukyakarika. Both arguments are inconsequential and can be simply 
answered. Gaudapada the Samkhya author comments only on die first sixty 
nine verses of the Karika (Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987). But here I deal, 
Gaudapada's Samkhyakarikabhasya. 
1 was surprised during my research work, to learn that the renowned Muslim 
writer Al-Beruni, accounted of Indian culture (1030 A.D), mentions, "Cauda 
the anchorite" as an authority on Samkhya philosophy (Hulin, 1978). He has 
translated some of the Samkhya manuscripts into Persian, which he ascribes to 
Kapila (Hurley, 2007). He had already translated into Arabic an assured "Book 
Samkhya" to which he refers at various places of his account of Indian 
philosophy. Between the manuscript quoted by him and that of Gaudapada as 
wen as Paramartha-s Chinese vetston there extst - ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
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commentary of Gaudapada was foundation of the Chinese commentary which 
is still preserved. But the researches of Takakusu have certainly recognized the 
fact that this commentary differs to significantly from that of Gaudapada to 
have been derived from it, and that both it and the commentary of Gaudapada 
must go back eventually to a general source (Keith, 1975). 
According to tradition, Vachaspati Mishra, the well-known exponent of Indian 
philosophy was a Maithila Brahmin from the province of Bihar. He lived either 
in the middle of the ninth century (841) or towards the latter half of the tenth 
century (976) (Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987). The era of Vacaspati's literary 
activity has for a long time been regarded as quite well detennined. Critics, in 
fact, were relying on the writer's own affirmation that he had finished that work 
in the year '898'. Assuming that the reference was to the Vikrama-era, this 
would communicate to A.D. 841. However, various contemporary researchers 
have questioned that recognition and have tried to reveal that the reference is to 
the Saka-era, (analogous to A.D. 976). Srinivasan, S. A., challenges both of 
these interpretations, viewing that, at the present phase of the investigation, the 
merely secure end is that 'Vacaspatimisra lived some time subsequent to 
Jayantabhatta (who completed his Nyayamanjari towards A.D. 890) and prior 
to Udayana whose Laksanavali is dated A.D. 890'. In the series of Vacaspati's 
commentaries the Samkhyatattvakaumudi ought to be the last but one, 
approaching immediately prior to the Bhamati (Hulin, 1978). A passage from 
Rajavarttika (a work about which there is no exact information) in Vacaspati 
Misra's commentary on the Samkhya Karika says that it was called the 
Sastitantra because it dealt with the existence of prakrti, its oneness, its 
divergence from Purusas, its thoughtfulness from Purusas, the multiplicity of 
Purusas, association and departure from Purusas, the evolution of the 
categories, the immobility of the Purusas and the five viparyyayas, nine tustis, 
the defects of organs of twenty eight kinds, and the eight Siddhis. Although the 
content of the Sastitantra as specified in Ahirbudhuya Samhita is unlike from 
it, and it appears from it that the Samkhya of the Sastitantra referred to in the 
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Ahirbudhya Samhita was of a theistic nature similar to the doctrine of the 
Pancaratra Vaisnavas and the Ahirbudhuya Samhita says that Kapila's theory 
of Samkhya was a Vaisnava one (Dasgupta, 1922). 
According to Umesha Mishra, the order of Vacaspati's writings is as follows: 
Nyayakanika (a commentary on Mandana Misra's Vidhiviveka), Tattvasamiksa 
(now lost), Tattvabindu (an innovative work on the theory of meaning in Purva 
Mimamsa), Nyayasucinibandha (a work attempting to set up the number and 
order of the Nyayasutra), Nyayavarttikatatparyatika (a commentary on 
Uddyotakara's Nyayavarttika), Tattvakaumudi (on Isvarakrsna's 
Samkhyakarika), Tattvavaisaradi (a commentary on Patanjali's Yogasutra and 
the Bhasya by Vyasa), and Bhamati (on Samkara's Brahmasutrabhasya). The 
Tattvakaumudi ('Moonlight on the Truth' of Samkhya) was translated into 
German by Richard Garbe in 1891. The transcript was significantly edited 
(based on some ninety manuscripts) by Srinivasan, S.A., in 1967. An English 
translation was equipped by Jha, G., in 1896, which was revised and re-edited 
by Patkar, M. M., (along with an introduction and key notes by Sharma Har 
Dutt) in 1965. The subsequent review is based on this latter version and 
translation of the transcript. 
The Tattvakaumudi itself is a quite easy and uncomplicated exhibition of the 
Samkhya Karika and lacks the comprehensive analyses and penetrating 
polemic so distinctive of some of the other works of Vacaspati, "for instance, 
the Tattvavaisaradi, the Nyayavarttikatatparyatika, and the Bhamati)". One 
has the thought either that Samkhya was no longer an essential philosophical 
tradition in Vacaspati's period or that Vacaspati himself was not known with 
the facts of the old Samkhya system. The manuscript has been traditionally 
very essential, conversely, for it has encouraged a long tradition of sub-
commentaries coming down to the present day. Furthermore, it is fair to say 
that it is by far the most excellent identified transcript of Samkhya all over 
India (Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987). The Tattvakaumudi is a very practical 
i± 
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commentary. Factual, its historical significance cannot compare with that of the 
Yuktidipika, but its philosophical importance is much superior. Vacaspati was 
systematically familiar with every system of Indian philosophy, orthodox as 
well as non-orthodox, and it is this encyclopaedic knowledge that he uses to 
illuminate the main complicated points of the Samkhya doctrine. His method of 
exhibition is articulate, stylish, easy-flowing, although very much technical at 
times (Hulin, 1978). Vacaspati holds that there is no contact (samyoga) of any 
state of understanding, through which the state becomes distorted into 
consciousness (Keith, 1975). 
Let us ultimately recall that the well-known Sarvadarsanasamgraha (Summary 
of all Systems) by Madhavacarya (14th century A.D.) includes a chapter on 
Samkhya. In spite of common references to the Karikas themselves, its actual 
source is the Tattvakaumudi, which is quoted or paraphrased throughout the 
chapter (Hulin, 1978). This brings us to the Tattvakaumudi itself, which, as 
Larson has noted, 'is by far the well-known manuscript of Samkhya all over 
India' (Burley, 2007). 
Vijnanabhiksu's Samkhyapravacanabhasya is another essential work on the 
Samkhya philosophy (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). The 
Samkhyapravacanabhasya literally means the 'commentary on the description 
of Samkhya'. It is an unabridged commentary on the Samkhya Sutra. These 
aphorisms may be called the 'Larger Samkhya Aphorisms' and the other, that 
is, the Tattvasamasay the 'Shorter Samkhya Aphorisms'. Vijnanabhiksu was 
conscious of both of the aphorisms and treated them as the comprehensive and 
the concise expositions of Kapila's formulation of the Samkhya system 
respectively (Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987). 
Vijnanabhiksu appears as the emblematic syncretistic philosopher. He clearly 
believes that each of the orthodox darsanas represents a precious approach to 
the uUimate reality. Vijnanabhiksu's intention was to restore the authority ol" 
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the Samkhya system amid the other orthodox darsanas, to make 'the moon of 
knowledge' once more (Hulin, 1978). 
The finest approximation for the date of Vijnanabhiksu is still the latter half of 
the sixteenth century as was argued long ago by Garbe and acknowledged by 
Keith, Wintemitz, and most others. Udayavira Sastrin, although, has argued for 
a fourteenth century date, claiming that Vijnanabhiksu knew the work of 
Sadananda of the Vedantasara and ought to, consequently, is sited at the end of 
the fourteenth century. Chakravarti argues for a fifteenth century date based on 
details in a list of manuscripts representing that a text of Vijnanabhiksu had 
been copied in the fifteenth century. These latter arguments emerge to be based 
on quite inadequate confirmation, and it is perhaps sensible to preserve the 
sixteenth century date in the absence of supplementary data. Vijnanabhiksu 
composed a number of works, and R. T. Rukmani in the Introduction to her 
new translation of the first part of Vijnanabhiksu's Togavarttika suggests that 
Vijnanabhiksu's writings be sited in the following chronological order: 
(I) Upadesaratnamala (a Vedanta work), (II) Vijnanamrtahhasya (his 
commentary on the Brahmasutra), (III) a series of eight commentaries on 
various Upanishads, (IV) Isvaragitabhasya, (V) Brahmadarsa (a Vedanta 
work), (VI) Samkhyaapravacanabhasya and Yogavarttika (both of which 
were written about the same period) (Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987), (Vll) 
Samkhyasara and at last (VIII) yogasarasamgraha (Radhakrishnan, Vol.2, 
1923).' 
Vijnanabhiksu, the supreme expounder of Samkhya, says in many places of his 
work Vijnanamrtabhasya that Samkhya was originally theistic, and that the 
atheistic Samkhya is merely a Prahdhivada (an overstated effort to demonstrate 
that no assumption of Isvara is essential to describe the world process) while 
the Mahabharata points out that the distinction among Samkhya and Yoga is 
this, that the former is atheistic, though the latter is theistic. The inconsistency 
among the two accounts of Sastitantra suggests that the original Sastitantra as 
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referred to in the Ahirbudhuya Samhita was then revised and noticeably 
altered. This assumption is corroborated by the fact that Gunaratna does not 
declare amid the essential Samkhya works Sastitantra but Sastitantroddhara 
(revised version of Sastitantra). Perhaps the earlier Sastitantra was lost even 
prior to Vacaspati's period. If we consider the Sastitantra referred to in the 
Ahirbudhuya Samhita to be in all necessary parts the similar work which was 
composed by Kapila and based devotedly on his teachings, subsequently it has 
to be supposed that Kapila's Samkhya was theistic. It seems possible that this 
pupil Asuri tried to popularise it. However, it seems that an immense alteration 
occurred when Pancasikha the pupil of Asuri came to deal with it. It is said in 
Samkhya Karika that the literature was divided by him into various parts (tena 
bahudhakrtam tantram). The accurate sense of this orientation is hard to 
estimate. It might indicate that the original Sastitantra was rewritten by him in 
different treatises. The mere assumption that countless be ventured is that 
Pancasikha perhaps modified approved it as Kapila's work. If this assumption 
is thought logical, then we have three strata of Samkhya, first a theistic one, the 
details of which are lost, but which is reserved in a customized shape by the 
Patanjala school of Samkhya, second atheistic one as represented by 
Pancasikha, and a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Samkhya system 
(Dasgupta, 1922). If it is genuine to apply the term 'renaissance' with reference 
to these later Samkhya traditions that focus on the Tattvasamasasutra and the 
Samkhya Sutra it is certainly because of the work of Vijnanabhiksu (and to a 
slighter amount his pupil, Bhavaganesa). In the Kramadipika and Aniruddha's 
Samkhyasutravrtti, the analysis of Samkhya still very much followed beside the 
older lines of the main tradition of the Samkhya Karika and its commentaries, 
still although the occasion for the Kramadipika and Samkhyasutravrtti were the 
emergence of the apparently recent Sutra collection. With Vijnanabhiksu, 
though, innovative guidelines in the understanding of the old Samkhya are 
obviously apparent (Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987). 
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Much more essential is another newly discovered commentary on the Karika is 
Yuktidipika. According to a colophon at the end of one manuscript, it should be 
regarded as a work by Vacaspati Misra. Both Chakravarti and Pandeya, though, 
agree to refuse that ascription, On the other hand, both are tending to recognize 
the Yuktidipika with the Rajavartika, alluded to by Vacaspati Misra himself 
(Hulin, 1978). The Yuktidipika (luminosity of argumentation), of a mysterious 
author, this commentary must have originated about 550 A.D. It is the only 
work which deals with the theories of the classical Samkhya with larger facts 
and is, in general, the most significant source for the classical Samkhya 
(Frauwallner, 1973). 
The title of the transcript, "A Lamp on the Intellectual Coherence (of the 
Samkhya Karika)'^ indicates that the intention of the commentary is to describe 
the overall analysis of the Karika and to guard the intellectual coherence of the 
entire from all objections (Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987). An eccentricity of 
the Yuktidipika is the division of the entire text of the Samkhya Karika into four 
prakaranas and eleven ahnikas. Some portions of this commentary are still 
mislaid, the most significant gap being placed among Karika-59 and Karika-64 
(conclusion of tenth and opening of eleventh ahnika). It seems that the writer of 
the Yuktidipika was well versed in the grammatical tradition, because he 
plentifully quotes from Panini, Patanjali and even Bhartrhan. In spite of that, 
his method of description remains quite base and unrefined. The method of the 
writer also is antiquated and extremely polemical. He first of all puts in a nut-
shell what he has to say, and afterwards expand the same. In doing so he 
attacks the view of the rival who also in his turn re-attacks that of the 
defendant. In this method attacking, re-attacking and counter-attacking go on 
constantly till the accepted conclusion is reached. This method has occasionally 
rendered it hard to mark out the place where the account of the rival begins and 
that of the defendant ends (Hulin, 1978). In the Yuktidipika one finds the 
subsequent comment: 
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"Yasya asmipratyayasya visesagrahanam bhavati sabde ham sparse ham rupe 
ham rase ham gandhe ham iti"; which might be translated "when there is an 
egoistic sense, exact apprehensions arise as (in the old saying) I am in sound, I 
am in touch, I am in form, I am in taste, I am in smell" (Larson and 
Bhattacharya, 1987). 
Furthermore, there are two other works on Samkhya, viz., Simananda's 
Samkhyatattvavivecana and Bahavaganesa's Samkhyatattvayatharthyadipana 
(both latter than Vijnanabhiksu) of authentic philosophical significance have 
also been generously consulted. Gunaratna also mentions two other 
authoritative Samkhya works, viz. Matharabhasya and Atreyatantra of these 
the second is perhaps the identical as Caraka's conduct of Samkhya, for we 
recognize that the sage Atri is the narrator in Caraka's work and for that it was 
called Atreyasamhita or Atreyatantra. Nothing is known of the 
Matharabhasya. 
Also we hear of a Sastitantrasastra as being one of the oldest Samkhya works. 
This is described in the Ahirbudhnya Samhita as containing two books of thirty 
two and twenty eight chapters (Dasgupta, 1922). 
We recognize of one Samkhya teacher in particular, Madhava, who maintained 
that nature (pradhana) evolves by the force which is preceded (caused) by 
karma, and that samsara is beginning less, this appears to indicate that he 
discarded the idea of world periods followed by improved creation. His main 
changes in the Samkhya system earned him the nickname 'demolisher of 
Samkhya' (samkhyavainasika or samkhyanasaka) (Bronkhorst, 2000). 
Of the standard works on Samkhya only three are available at present, viz., 
Samkhya Sutras, Tattva Samasa and Samkhya Karika (Virupakshanada, 
November 1995). 
I may possibly believe that the Samkhya, as a philosophical method based on 
an enumeration of principles (tattva), is as well as predictable in these above 
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mentioned earliest texts (Hulin, 1978). Its antiquity appears from the fact that 
the Samkhya predisposition of thought pervades all the literature of ancient 
India including the Srutis, Smrtis and Puranas (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). 
A large amount of Samkhya literature appears to have been lost, and there 
seems to be no stability of tradition from earliest period up to the era of the 
commentators. In such efficient works as we have, one seems to have a misty 
view of a magnificent system of tentative metaphysics. The analysis of all 
prehistoric systems requires a positive attempt, but even as in the case of 
various systems where we have a huge amount of literature and a stability of 
tradition, the creation is chiefly of the nature of translation of ideas in to 
present concepts, here in Samkhya the creation at various places involves 
supplying of mislaid links from one's imagination. It is perilous work, but 
unless one does it one cannot be said to realize Samkhya as a philosophy. It is a 
task that one is indebted to undertake. It is an enthralling task because Samkhya 
is a bold and positive philosophy. In discussing Samkhya philosophy, 
subsequently, after one has pursued chronological work as far as possible, after 
one has examine all of the existing texts, and after one has studied all of the 
criticisms of Samkhya in the generously proportioned classical philosophical 
literature, one has merely attained what Bhattacharya, K. C, has appropriately 
called 'a misty view of a magnificent sj'stem of tentative metaphysics' (Larson 
and Bhattacharya, 1987). 
There are different interpretations and approaches regarding the origin of the 
word "Samkhya". The origin of the name "Samkhya" is masked in mystery. 
According to few thinkers, the name "Samkhya" is an adjustment from 
Samkhya meaning number, and has been applied to this philosophical because 
it aims at an exact knowledge of truth by the enumeration of the ultimate 
objects of knowledge. According to another, though, the word "Samkhya" 
means perfect knov/ledge (Samyog-Jnana), and a philosophy in which we have 
such knowledge is fairly named Samkhya. Similar to the Nyaya-Vaisesika 
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system, the Samkhya aims at the knowledge of truth for the realistic reason of 
putting an end to all pain and suffering. It gives us knowledge of the self which 
is undoubtedly superior to that known by the other systems, excluding 
conceivably the Vedanta. Therefore, it may very well be characterised as the 
Samkhya in the sense of a pure metaphysical knowledge of the self. It is a 
metaphysic of dualistic realism. Although the Nyaya and the Vaisesika admit 
the ultimate mind and souls, Samkhya recognises merely two kinds of uhimate 
realities, namely, spirit and matter (purusa and prakrti). The nature of these two 
ultimate realities and other imitative realities will be considered in the 
Samkhya metaphysics (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). Samkhya also means a 
sense of thinking and counting. Here thinking is with reference to some 
fundamental principles of the knowledge of Purusa and counting refers to the 
twenty four principles bom out of Prakrti. This dual implication of the word 
has been put forward by Vijnanabhiksu in his preface to the 
Samkhyapravacana hasya (Virupakshanada, November 1995). Samkhya 
moreover, means enumeration, discrimination, thought, and analysis (Werner, 
1997). Because the term "Samkhya" means enumeration or describing to 
number, one logical point of departure for presenting the Samkhya 
philosophical system as an absolute system of human communication is to 
outline the more outstanding sets of enumerations. As an adjective, the term 
refers to any enumerated set or category and can apparently be used in any 
investigation in which enumeration or computation is an outstanding quality 
(for example, mathematics, grammar, psychology, medicine, and so on) 
(Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987). Samkhya also means Samyak Khyan or 
Samyak jnana or discriminating knowledge. It connotes the enumeration of the 
categories used by the system to demarcate the constitution of the world 
(Tiwari, 2009). The system takes its name from the fact that it arrives at its end 
by means of theoretical analysis, and the name is defensible as being suitable to 
a system which gives a logical enumeration of the principles of the cosmos. 
However this predisposition to enumeration is universal to all Hindu systems of 
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thought. In the early texts, Samkhya is used in the sense of philosophical 
consideration and not numerical reckoning. This particular system, which 
expounds by careful consideration the nature of purusa or spirit, and the other 
entities, acquired its important title (Radhakrishnan, Vol.2, 1923). 
The entire history of Samkhya literature can be approximately divided into 
three periods; (1) the pre-Samkhya speculations starting with the Vedic hymns 
until the beginning of the Christian era, (2) the classical period subjugated by 
the Samkhya Karika and their commentaries and (3) the late Samkhya, as 
originates in the Samkhya Sutra and allied texts. Of the later prose Upanishads 
(400-200 BCE), the Prasna contains an inclusive list of existing doctrines, 
which tallies very intimately with that of the manifestations of prakrti in 
classical Samkhya. Amid other documented sites of pre-classical Samkhya, the 
subsequent merit to be mentioned; early collections of doctrines and laws such 
as the Manavadharmasastra also recognized as the Manusmrti (200 BCE), 
treatises on Indian medical science (ayurveda), particularly the Susrutasamhita 
and Carakasamhita and a segment in an early (100 BCE) description of the life 
of the Buddha identified as the Buddhacarita of Asvaghosa. A supplementary 
manuscript of Kautilya's Arthasastra (Tourth century BCE to first century CE), 
legendary names only three philosophical approaches (anviksiki) in its second 
verse; these are Samkhya, Yoga and Lokayata. One more contribution to the 
somewhat mystifying image of pre-classical Samkhya is provided by an 
exposition belonging to the Pancaratra cult of Vaisnavism entitled the 
Ahirbudhnya Samhita (Compendium of the serpent from the depths). The 
Pancaratra or Bhagavata cult is usually supposed to be slightest as old as 
Buddhism (i.e., fourth century BCE), though the documentary sources allied 
with it are probable to be noticeable later on. The Ahirbudhnya basically a 
work of Tantric Vainavism, comprises material that was perhaps collected over 
a period of numerous centuries during the first millennium of the Common Era. 
The motive for mentioning it here is that in its twelfth chapter are included 
summaries of two prior works or bodies of doctrine (tantras), which deal with 
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Samkhya (Burley, 2007,). Though, it is the speculative portions of the 
Mahabharata (essentially the Moksadharma and ih& Bhagavad-Gita.) which 
provide us with the richest reference material, enabling us specifically to 
rebuild at least some aspects of the progress of the Samkhya. The early period 
of Samkhya speculation cannot be exactly dated, as spotted elements of the 
doctrine may be traced back to the oldest parts of the Vedas itself. But the 
Karikas (mnemonic verses) relate to the Samkhya in the similar way that the 
prose Sutras relates to the enduring darsanas. In other words, they lay down the 
fundamental belief of the doctrine, originating a series of commentaries. The 
classical Samkhya, in terms of its ontological, cosmological, and 
investigational aspects, will become apparent from the instant emphasis is 
placed upon the contrary order. It is essential to note, nonetheless, that the 
Katha-Upanishads seems still to involve a firm kind of monist structure. 
The interest of European scholars was, for the first time, focused on this 
doctrine by Colebrooke, H.T., in his description of the Samkhya as, 'a system 
of philosophy in which accuracy of reckoning is observed in the enumeration 
of its principles'. Firmly speaking, the Samkhya represents the tendency of 
thought which aims at approaching truth through an accurate and 
comprehensive enumeration of its constitutive principles or categories (tattva). 
Moreover its technical sense, though, the word was occasionally used in 
reference to the common idea of reasoning. This in particular is true for the era 
earlier the rise of the so called classical Samkhya (Hulin, 1978). The classical 
appearance has established its ultimate formulation in the Samkhya Karika, and 
has never been surpassed and it has remained authoritative for the whole future. 
At the beginning of the classical Samkhya system stands the theory of 
knowledge. It teaches the means of right knowledge, aesthetic perception, 
inference and reliable communication (Frauwallner, 1973). The third and last 
era in the progress of Samkhya thought begins roughly at 1300 A.D., and its 
period extends over about three centuries. In the universal development of 
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Indian thought this era is noticeable by an increasing tendency towards 
syncretism (Hulin, 1978). 
Gunaratna (14*** century A.D.), a commentator of Saddarsanasamuccaya, 
mentions two schools of Samkhya the Maulika (original) and the Uttar (latter), 
of these the doctrine of the Maulikya Samkhya is supposed to be that which 
thought that there was a separate pradhana for each ataman (maulikya Samkhya 
hyatmanamatmanam prati prthak pradhanam vadanti). But in the 
Mahabharata-XII, three schools of Samkhya are mentioned, viz., those who 
admitted twenty four categories, those who admitted twenty five (the famous 
orthodox Samkhya system) and those who admitted twenty six categories. This 
last school admitted a supreme being in addition to purusa and this was the 
twenty sixth principles (Dasgupta, 1922). 
Moreover, there is an account of the Samkhya system in the Tamil Classic, the 
Manimekhalai. From the Chinese sources it is learnt that there were eighteen 
Samkhya schools. Two of the most important schools were those of Pancasikha 
and Varsaganya (Mahadevan, 1974). 
The Bhagavad-Gita uses the Samkhya in the sense of knowledge, so does the 
Mahabharata at other places also. The system is principally intellectual and 
theoretical, true knowledge is the knowledge of the departure of the purusa 
from the prakrti. Samkhya is also the Philosophy of numbers (as already 
mentioned above), because it deals with twenty five categories. As a 
Philosophy of numbers, it might have influenced the Pythagorean Philosophy 
(Sharma, 1960). And these twenty five categories are briefly specified in the 
table below: 






Elements 5 to 9 
Elements 10 to 14 
Elements 15 to 19 




The intellect (Mahat or Buddhi). 
The self or the arrogance of self (Ahamkara). 
Mind (Manas). 
Five cognitive senses viz. sight, taste, smell, touch 
and hearing. 
Five active faculties viz., tongue, hands, feet, annul and 
genital. 
Five subtle primary elements (tanmantra) viz., essences 
of form or colour, taste, smell, touch and sound. 
Five general gross elements (maha-bhata) viz., earth, 
water, fire, air and space. 
The Supreme Spirit or Purusa. 
The five organs of perception are the functions of sight, hearing, smell, taste 
and touch. The organs of action are the functions of the tongue, feet, hands, and 
the organs of evacuation annul as well as reproduction genitals. The world as 
the object of perception has the five subtle primary elements subsequent to the 
five sense organs. These are the essences of colour, taste, smell, touch and 
sound. Five general gross elements are earth, water, fire, air and space (Tiwari, 
2009). 
A concise outline of the fundamental principles of Samkhya philosophy is 
given here to make possible the study of Samkhya. The Samkhya lays down 
four fold divisions of categories based on their respective causal and productive 
efficiency. These are as under: 
(1) Productive, (2) Productive and Produced, (3) Produced, and (4) Neither 
productive nor produced. This categorization into a fourfold division includes 
twenty four tattvas also, the root product solely productive. The second 
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diversity are the other principles like Buddhi etc., this part takes of the nature 
of the both, the productive as well as the produced, in as much as evolves 
ahamkara and the rest. The Purusa is neither the productive nor the produced 
and also it is without any attributes. All the accessories that we observe are the 
outcome of the very nature is entirely free from all these (Virupakshanada, 
November 1995). 
The Samkhya is a system of realism, dualism, and pluralism. It is realism 
because it recognizes the truth of the exterior world, it is dualism because it 
holds that there are two basic realities, different from each other, viz., spirit and 
matter and it is pluralism because it believes in a plurality of spirits. Therefore, 
it is a qualitative dualism and a numerical pluralism (Mahadevan, 1974). As I 
have already stated that, the Samkhya maintains the plurality of the purusa, but 
remains silent on God. It is, in short, a pluralistic spiritualism, an atheistic 
realism and an inflexible dualism (Sharma, 1960). Samkhya philosophy implies 
the logical or reasonable contemplation of self and not-self, purusa and prakrti. 
Without such a logical thinking, knowledge is impossible for this reason, the 
study of Samkhya is thought to be essential for each one. Several references to 
it are to be originated in most of the religious texts, from the Upanishads down 
to the texts on astrology (Sharma, 2006). Samkhya, a world renunciation 
attitude, posits a dualism of souls (purusa an infinity of isolated, inactive spirit 
outside space and time) and primitive matter (pradhana or mua prakriti) that 
transforms itself (parinama) in to the cosmos of intellectual and material 
phenomena. Samkhyites believes in Satkaryavada 'theory of causation' which 
holds that products pre-exist in a potential form in their original material causes 
(Hartley, 2005). The Samkhya Philosophy assumes the authenticity of purusa 
and prakrti from the fact of knowledge with its differences the reality of 
knowledge with its differences among the subject and the object. No 
description of knowledge is possible if a knowing self and an object known. 
The Samkhya endeavours to give a comprehensible description of all 
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knowledge, why we have it and how we obtain it (Radhakrishnan, Vol.2, 
1923). 
Among all the Indian schools of thought, Samkhya School occupied a 
transitional position among the Idealist Vedanta and the Realist Purva-
Mimansa group. Samkhya holds prakrti to be an ultimate reality along with 
Purusa. A close study of Samkhya reveals that it is only close to Vedanta 
(Virupakshanada, November 1995). 
Medieval Vaisnavism (the sect of visnu as Supreme Being) made use of 
cosmological ideas copied from Samkhya. On the other hand, Zimmer, H., has 
strongly argued that Samkhya had its origins exterior the Bhramanical 
tradition, in close association with such unorthodox movements as Buddhism 
and Jainism, which themselves did not know the existence of a creator God. 
The use made of Samkhya ideas in the Upanishads represents, on this analysis, 
an amalgamation among Aryan and original forms of religion. Since it emerged 
in its classical and Medieval form, Samkhya thought that reality consisted in an 
unitary material substance (prakrti or nature) which evolves, on the one hand, 
into the world as apparent by our senses and on the other hand, into an endless 
number of different souls (purusas) (Edwards, 1967). 
While I have previously mentioned that, the Samkhya believes in 
Satkaryavada. All material effects are the modification (parinama) of prakrti. 
They pre-exist in the eternal bosom of prakrti and purely come cut of it at the 
time of creation and return to it at the time of dissolution (Sharma, 1960). 
Hence, the effect is being present in its cause (Frauwallner, 1973). 
Prime matter is believed that, to be consisting of three strands or qualities 
"gunas", sattva (righteousness and light), rajas (dynamic energy) and tamas 
(heavy and dark). Prior to the cosmic revolution, they are in a state of 
equilibrium, cancelling out one another's properties (Bartley, 2005). The 
Yuktidipika too interprets the triads as standing for happiness, distress and 
CHAPTER-I SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY: A GENERIC VIEW 
delusion. Their mere existence is said to prompt the revolution of material 
nature (Bartley, 2011). Such a schema is considered by the fact that the gunas 
are not intrinsic 'qualities' of the buddlii etc., but to a certain extent 
consecutive stages of a cosmic method of evolution. In the second prototype, 
the evolution, as its name implies, is vertical in other words it pertains most 
significantly to the construction of the psychological and physical attributes of 
the entity. In this case the Gunas emerge as psychological or ethical qualities 
belonging to human beings (Hulin, 1978). The three original potencies or 
gunas, conjures up the world process for the advantage of purusas and creates 
for them material bodies, senses and mental functions, nearly creating for them 
prakrtic, extraordinary or experienced personalities (Werner, 1997). In the 
Manu Smrti also which is contemporary with the Mahabharata there is a 
thorough explanation of sattva, rajas and tamas and reference to the three 
pramanas (Jha, August 1965). Tamas is also described in the Rig Veda, which 
later thought the form of the un-manifest. This very Rig Veda shows the 
dissolution of the elements in the elemental world in its cause, therefore 
indicates satkaryavada to which philosophy Samkhya belongs. Furthermore, 
the sattva, rajas and tamas of the Samkhya Philosophy are explained in the 
Chandogya Upanishads, and the Samkhya categories are clearly mentioned in 
the Katha Upanishads. It is renowned fact that Svetasvatara Upanishad is 
basically a Samkhya Upanishad because it undoubtedly mentions the Samkhya 
categories. Again in the same Upanishad words like Prakrti and gunas are also 
originates here. The state of such words as sattva, rajas and tamas by name, the 
exhibition of five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements, 
the reference to the Samkhya categories of Ksetrsjna, Sankalpa, Adhyavasaya. 
Abhimana and Linga evidently subsequent to the formation of the Samkhya 
system of thought (Virupakshanada, November 1995). In later Samkhya is 
originating the essential progress that each of the three gunas is assorted and 
that the infinity of prakrti is due to their imprecise number (Hiriyanna, 1993). 
However, numbers are classified by the Vaisheshikas as one of the sub 
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varieties of the categories (padartha) and qualities (gunas). A quality is a non-
repeatable particular property (Hartley, 2005). 
Samkhya also accepts three means of valid knowledge (pramanas); (1) 
perception (pratyaksa), (2) inference (anumana), and (3) testimony (sabda) 
(Mahadevan, 1974). 
With regard to the problem of God, we discover that the chief predisposition of 
the Samkhya is to do away with the theistic belief According to it, the 
existence of God cannot be proved in any case. We need not confess God to 
describe the world for prakrti is the sufficient cause of the world as a whole. 
God as eternal and static spirit cannot be the creator of the world, for to create 
an effect the cause ought to change and convert itself into the effect. Some 
Samkhya commentators and writers, though, endeavour to explain that the 
system admits the existence of God as the Supreme Being who is the observer 
but not the creator of the world (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). 
Years before that Kapila himself was looked upon as an embodiment of the 
highest God who supposed this appearance in order to show support to the 
world. This highest God was not though a creator God, references to a so called 
Sesvara Samkhya 'Samkhya with God' which one fmds in the literature of 
other schools (Bronkhorst, 2000). 
The original Samkhya was monistic and theistic. But the classical Samkhya is 
atheistic (Srinivas, and Sastry, 2007). Samkhya is mainly a non-theistic, 
world-denunciatory and Gnostic attitude, rather than a religion for the 
individual engrossed in everyday life and ritual religion. Its ambition is the 
abolition of pain by the suppression of its ultimate cause (Bartley, 2011). 
The Samkhya system represents a prominent departure in thought from what 
may be called the formalistic practice of mind. By its emphasis on the principle 
of stability, it results, in some extent, the desertion of the propensity to view the 
universe as tied up in neat parcels. It undermines the basics of supernatural 
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religion by substituting evolution for creation. The world is not the act of a 
creator God, who summoned up by a single fiat of his will a world fully 
dissimilar from himself, but is the creation of the contact among the infinite 
number of spirit and the ever active prakrti, or the potentiality of nature what 
Plato calls 'the holder and nurse of all generations' (Radhakrishnan, Vol.2, 
1923). 
The history of the Samkhya system has previously been surveyed and need not 
be repeated here, but it may be constructive to summarize briefly the 
diachronic locations for the synchrony system that is to be presented in the 
sequel, i.e.: 
(1) There was a rational Samkhya intangible system, frequently referred to as 
the Sastitantra (the system or science of sixty topics), that was generally 
recognized by the year 400 of the Common Era (that is to say, the intervening 
era that is post-Isvarakrsna and pre-Dignaga). 
(2) The intangible system had been in existence for some centuries earlier and 
had been undergoing substantial variation through the work of Paficasikha, 
Varsaganya, Vindhyavasin, and so on. 
(3) There were perhaps a multiplicity of attempts in this early era to 
recapitulate the fundamental contours of the system, but one summary came to 
be accepted as a model appearance, specifically, that summary as put forward 
in Isvarakrsna's Samkhya Karika. 
(4) This system, customized in some essential compliments (next to the lines of 
Varsaganya's and Vindhyavasin's views) is the foundation of Patanjali's 
yogasutra and its commentaries. 
(5) The commentaries on the Karika come significantly later, and distant from 
the Yuktidipika, emerge to lack a direct grip of the system and still the 
CHAPTER-I SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY: A GENERIC VIEW 
Yuktidipika presupposes the filled content of the system as a substitute of 
presenting that content. 
(6) The Tattvasamasa and the Samkhya Sutra mutually with their 
commentaries, however certainly preserving much old material, are nonetheless 
late texts that lean to understand the old Samkhya system with a distinguished 
Vedanta predisposition (Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987). 
Garbe Richard, who has prepared an extraordinary study of the Samkhya 
philosophy, says; 'in Kapila's doctrine for the first time in the history of the 
world, the absolute self-determination and liberty of the human mind, its 
complete assurance in its own powers, were exhibited. It is the most important 
system of philosophy that India has ever produced. Still those who consider 
this approximation as inflated will admit that the Samkhya is an outstanding 
effort in the kingdom of pure philosophy (Radhakrishnan, Vol.2, 1923). 
Consequently, the notion of Samkhya have been assayed an innovative with 
firm kinds of modem thought as reagents. We welcome the invigorated 
attention in this ancient philosophy, but object to the superficial absorption of it 
to any other analysis of existence, ancient or modem. There is, in fact, a natural 
propensity to examine back wholesale, well-known arguments and conclusion 
into a system which exhibits so many points of contact with psychology and 
physical science (Ghosh, 1997). 
A school which established teleological kinds of description at all levels, that is 
the Samkhya School. Samkhya does not emerge to have critically attempted to 
eradicate teleology. A central apprehension of the Samkhya philosophy is to 
describe how human beings and other living beings work. It does so by 
distinguishing two overall dissimilar and separate parts. On the one hand there 
is the soul (atman or pumsa), on the other that which is often called nature 
(prakrti). Nature as conceived of in Samkhya is consequently distant more than 
that which is enclosed by the natural sciences nowadays. Merely consciousness 
belongs to the soul, not to nature. Since soul and nature jointly are hypothetical 
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to describe how human beings work, one would anticipate that no 
anthropomorphic quality should be accredited to either of them independently. 
Samkhya subsequently presents an investigation of human beings. There is a 
passage in the Yuktidipika, explaining human conduct or at least a definite form 
of it, in terms of the activities of the various organs (Bronkhorst, 2000). 
Therefore, I realize that, it should be the aim of the Samkhya philosophy to 
teach people, to recognize the supreme difference among soul and matter in its 
most subtle modifications, as it appears in the interior organs. A man has 
attained the utmost aim of human action if this difference is absolutely 
comprehensible to him; discriminative knowledge delivers soul from the 
misery of the eternal flow of existence and abolishes the requisite of being bom 
again. The Samkhya philosophy is already saturated with that pessimism which 
has set irs stamp on the outcomes of this system (Garbe, 1897). As a 
consequence the basis of Samkhya and if not, it is clearly bear in mind, the 
system is bound to be misunderstood and misinterpreted. But Samkhya is more 
than a system of thought. It is a belief which men have lived by and found 
solace in from an isolated antiquity. There is inadequate reference, in reality, to 
this belief in works on the subject. Samkhya, in fact, a proud challenge, as it 
suggests that other explanations fail wrap up the whole ground because they do 
not resolve step by step the composite comprehensiveness of authenticity into 
its simplest factors and therefore enumerate the different grades of 
complication. The battle was fought long ago and Samkhya, one may say, 
stood its arguments well enough against the onslaughts of opponent schools 
(Ghosh, 1997). 
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C H A P T E R - 2 
i ' Samkhya Metaphysics: 
During my research work I found that, the Samkhya philosophers in India 
presented an elevated metaphysics, which in spite of its staid boundaries, has 
been given very much significance by other Indian philosophers. As a 
consequence, it occupies unique place amid the six systems of Indian 
philosophy. Samkhya philosophers have particularly concentrated upon the 
problem of creation. According to Samkhya philosophy that which does not 
exist cannot come into existence and that which is existent cannot be absent 
(Sharma, 2006) and a non-entity can never be made an entity, that is to say, that 
which has never existed can never be brought into existence (Virupakshananda, 
November 1995). 
I. Samkhya Theory of Causation: 
The Samkhya metaphysics, especially its doctrine of prakrti, rests chiefly on its 
theory of causation which is identified as Satkaryavada (Chatterjee and Datta, 
2007). 
The basic question involved in any theory of causation is; does the effect pre-
exist in its material cause? Those who answer this question in the pessimistic 
way are called asatkaryavadins, whereas those who answer it in the positive 
way are called satkaryavadins. The satkaryavadins believe that the effect is not 
a new creation, but merely an explicit manifestation of that which was 
implicitly contained in its material cause. Here, another vital question arises: is 
the effect a real transformation or an unreal appearance of its cause? Those 
who believe that the effect is a real transformation of its cause are 
parinamavadins (parinama or real modification), while those who believe that it 
is an unreal appearance are called vivartavadins (vivarta or unreal appearance). 
Samkhya, Yoga and Ramanuja, believes in parinamavada. The view of 
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Samkhya and Yoga is called Prakrti-parinamavada, while the view of 
Ramanuja is called Brahma- parinamavada (Sharma, 1960). 
Amid the Indian theories of causation, satkaryavada and asatkaryavada can be 
regarded as the two chief doctrines by reference to which other Indian theories 
of causation may be easily formulated. As I previously mentioned that, the 
satkaryavadins argues that the effect already present in the material cause and 
so not fiindamentally new and diverse from the material cause. Since it is found 
that it is milk and not sand which gives rise to curd, the satkaryavadins contend . 
that the curd is already there in the milk in an un-manifested form although it 
becomes manifested only when it assumes a shape which is dissimilar from that 
of milk. So that, the key point which the satkaryavadins seems to have 
emphasised is the existence of the effect in the material cause even prior to its 
origination (Kar, 1985). According to Samkhya theory of causation, in short, 
everything (any phenomenon) has its material cause. All relations among cause 
and effect are conceived in the sense that the latter is always present in the 
former. The following are the Samkhya arguments in this favour: 
There are two types of causes; (a) material (in which the effect is latent) and (b) 
efficient or productive (which helps the effect to manifest itself). If we accept, 
nevertheless, that the material cause does not restrain the effect, the notion of 
productive cause loses its sense, for it has no object of action (Chande, 2000). 
Hence, the so called theory of causation in classical Samkhya is put forth in 
Samkhya Karika-9 as follows: 
"Asadakaranat upadanagrahanat sarvasambhavabhavat", 
"Saktasya sakyakaranat karanabhavat ca satkaryam" (Larson, 1969). 
The ideas contained in the above verse (sloka) may be described as under: 
(1) Asadakaranat: That which has no existence does not possess the capacity 
to create. That which does not exist cannot be the cause. Thus if the effect is 
not earlier or potentially present in the cause it is like the horns of a rabbit or 
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the louts in the sky which can never create anything. If the effect does not exist 
in the cause, then the cause can never manifest the effect. 
(2) Upadanagrahanat: For the creation of the object, particular cause, the 
constitutive cause is essential. If the effect is not present in the material cause, 
the later can never create the effect. Hence, the effect is the manifestation of the 
material cause because it is inescapably connected to it. 
(3) Sarvasambhavabhavat: If the effect is not related to the material cause, 
then any cause could manifest any effect. But experience dose not bear this out. 
Therefore, the effect is present in the cause prior to its manifestation. 
(4) Saktasya sakyakaranat: Creation is the manifestation of the concealed 
potential or power. A cause produces merely that effect which it has the 
potentiality to produce and no other if this were not true; one could acquire oil 
from sand. For this reason, the effect is present in un-manifest or potential from 
in its cause before it is produced. 
(5) Karanabhavat: There is identity among, cause and effect. Once the 
obstacle is isolated from the path of manifestation, the effect is articulated by 
the cause. Therefore, the effect is present in the cause prior to it is 
manifestation (Vatsyayan, 11* revised edition). 
Furthermore, Bhattacharya, K.C., in his book, 'Studies in Philosophy', 
efficiently paraphrases the sense of the above said verse as; "the effect is 
instantaneously recognized as what was implicit in the cause, as what has now 
the cause for its matter or material, as the only fortitude of the cause, as what 
the cause alone can become and as partaking of the nature of the cause. The 
cause in fact, is manifest in the effect as it's very self, the effect instantaneously 
showing it. The effect reveals the cause as having become it, as still becoming 
it and so far as it is itself manifest, as including the manifest effect within it" 
(Bhattacharya, 1956). In Samkhya Karika 15 and 16 Isvarakrsna asserts that the 
primal cause is avyakta (the un-manifest or prakrti or mulaprakrti) because of 
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the finiteness of definite things which necessitates a cause (bhedanam 
parimanat); because of homogeneity or similarity (samanvayat); because of the 
power or potency (of the cause) which the course of appearance impHes 
(saktitah pravritteh); because of the separation or distinction between the cause 
and its effect (with respect to modification or appearance) 
(karanakaryavibhagat); and because of the un-dividedness or consistency of the 
whole world (avibhaagd vaisvarupyasya) Moreover, says Isvarakrsna (in 
Samkhya Karika 16), the avyakta or mulaprakrti or prakrti functions because of 
or by the interaction of the three gunas, customized like water, due to the 
specific nature abiding in the respective gunas. The avyakta or prakrti is 
constituted by the three Gunas (sattva, rajas, and tamas), and miscellany in 
manifestation is due to the activity of these gunas, which are constantly 
undergoing change and transformation (parinama). The image of the water, 
according to all commentators, is to be interpreted in terms of the diversity of 
manifestations that is, water as rain, juice, etc., which manifestations or 
modifications nonetheless are eventually just one reality, namely prakrti. 
Another preferred image of the Samkhya system is that of milk and curds that 
is, the effect is merely a change or rearrangement or transformation (parinama) 
of that which is previously potentially and ingeniously present in the cause. 
The concept of satkaryavada, consequently, in classical Samkhya involves 
concurrently the concept of mulaprakrti, avyakta, vyakta, triguna. and 
parindma. Furthermore, the concept of satkaryavad as it relates to mulaprakrti, 
triguna, and parinama, though apparently alike, is nonetheless entirely separate 
from or uninvolved with the purusa, that is, the principle of pure consciousness, 
the observer, the witness. The concept of Satkaryavada, subsequently, is 
inextricably involved in the primary assertions of the Samkhya position, 
namely; (a) that the manifest world is real, (b) that the manifest world is 
completely and utterly comprehensible vis-a-vis the un-manifest and is to be 
construed as a bunged system, (c) that the manifest world has nothing to do 
with consciousness and its liberty and (d) even though pain (duhkha) appears to 
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be present in the manifest world as a feature of consciousness, in the closing 
investigation it is merely a manifestation and has no foundations in fact or 
putting the matter another way, pain has no place within the bunged system of 
comprehensible appearance and is therefore only a phenomenal manifestation 
which will naturally and impulsively dissipate when the bunged system of 
comprehensible appearance is appropriately grasped on the level of buddhi as 
distinct and unrelated to purusa (Larson, January 1975). Such, briefly, is the so 
called Samkhya theory of causation jointly with some of the important 
implications of the theory in the larger context of the overall Samkhya position 
(Collingwood, 1940). We shall see how this theory of causation is central to the 
Samkhya philosophy when I will come to discuss the Samkhya doctrine of 
evolution. 
II. Prakrti: 
According to dualistic metaphysics of Samkhya philosophy, there are two 
fundamental categories; Purusa (spirit) and Prakrti (matter), which are of 
absolutely contrasting natures. Purusa is not what prakrti is and prakrti is not 
what purusa is (Mahadevan, 1974). The theory that causation means a real 
change of the material cause leads to the notion of prakrti as the root cause of 
the world of objects. All worldly effects are dormant in this uncaused cause, 
because infinite retreat as to be avoided. It is the potentiality of nature, the 
holder and nurse of all generation. As the uncaused root cause, it is called 
prakrti; as the first principle of this universe it is called pradhana; as the un-
manifested state of all effects it is recognized as avyakta; as the enormously 
subtle and indiscernible thing which is only inferred from its product it is called 
anumana; as the unintelligent and unconscious principle it is called jada; and as 
the ever active infinite power it is called shakti (Sharma, 1960). Lokacharya 
writes that, it is called avida because it contradicts knowledge. It is called maya 
because it evolves the varied creation (Sharma, 2006). The products are caused, 
reliant, relative, numerous and impermanent as they are subjected to birth and 
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death or to construction and obliteration; but prakrti is uncaused, independent, 
absolute, one and eternal, being beyond construction and obliteration. The 
extreme subtleness of prakrti makes it un-manifest and imperceptible; we infer 
its existence through its products (Sharma, 1960). Prakrti is the basic or primal 
substance out of which the world evolves. Prakrti itself evolves under the 
influence of purusa. The origin of development or evolution follows a specific 
law of progression in space, time, mode and causality (parinama krama 
niyama) (Tiwari, 2099). According to the Samkhya system, prakrti is thought 
to be the ultimate principle at the back ground of the univerese. It is un-
manifested, undifferentiated, omnipresent, undecaying and unconscious 
(Chakravarti, 1951). Every object excepts prakrti has a cause. It precedes 
creation. All the effects of the universe are based and depend upon prakrti 
(Sharma, 2006). Prakrti is constituted by the three gunas of sattva, rajas and 
tamas (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). Each of them stands for a discrete feature 
of physical reality; roughly, Sattva, signifies whatever is pure and fine; Rajas, 
whatever is active and Tamas, what is stolid and offers resistance. The account 
shows that the gunas are not merely discrete but are also, in some measure, 
aggressive in their nature (Hiriyanna 1949). 
Primal matter evolves to produce the basic material and psychological realities 
tattvas, i.e., buddhi (intellect); ahamkara (one's sense of personality); manas 
(the co-ordinator of the separate sense-faculties and their deliverances); the five 
sense-facuhies (indriya); physical organs; the essences of sounds, touch, 
colours, tastes and smells and the gross elements; space, air, fire, water and 
earth which make up physical objects). These products contain the gunas in 
contradictory proportions and compose the world in which we inhabit (Hartley, 
2011). 
Samkhya gives five proofs for the existence of prakrti (Shanna, i960); these 
arguments (proofs) for the existence of prakrti are seen in Isvarakrsna's 
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Samkhya Karika-15. Vacaspati Misra elucidates and defends these arguments 
in his commentary Tattvakaumudi. These arguments are as follows: 
"Bhedanam parimanat, Samanvayat, Saktitah pravrttesca, 
Karana-karya-vibhagad, avibhagad-vaisvarupyasa" 
The translation of the above passage is stated as; "because of the finite nature 
of definite objects, because of homogeneity, because of evolution being due to 
the effectiveness of the cause of separation among cause and its products and 
because of the unification of the entire world (of effects)" (Kar, 1985). 
The above arguments for the existence of prakrti are described below: 
(1) Bhedanam Parimanat: All the things of the world are restricted, 
dependent, and relative and have an end. Therefore the cause which creates 
them should be infinite, independent, absolute and eternal. Such a cause is the 
prakrti. 
(2) Samanvayat: The things of the world possess some general qualities in 
spite of being diverse and due to this homogeneity they arouse pleasure, pain or 
apathy. Hence, there should be a general cause which, being obsessed of all the 
three qualities and being the sole cause in which all the objects of the world 
originate, may tie them in a common cord and which may produce or which 
itself is obsessed of one consistent nature. Such a cause is prakrti. 
(3) Pravrttesca: All effects arise out of cause in which they were present in 
un-manifest form. Evolution means the appearance of that which is involved. 
The energy which causes evolution in the universe should be involved in the 
cause of the universe. The cause is prakrti. 
(4) Karana-karya-vibhagad: Cause and effect are discrete from each other. 
The elements or objects are distinguished on the basis of cause and effect for 
example mahat is the cause and ahamkara is its effect. Effect is the explicit 
cause and cause is the implicit effect. Every cause has its effect. Therefore, the 
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universe must also have a cause in which the entire universe lies un-manifest. 
This is the un-manifest prakrti. 
(5) Avibhagad-vaisvarupyasa: Samkhya philosophers have accepted an 
identity between cause and effect. While going from the present into the past, 
the effect loses its identity in the cause. In this process every effect proceeds 
rearward and is dissolved in its cause. In this way, in order that absolute 
identity or homogeneity may be maintained in the universe, the mahat should 
also be dissolved in its cause. Therefore, the un-manifest is that in which all the 
effects dissolve and the universe appears undifferentiated (Sharma, 2006). 
III. Purusa: 
Besides prakrti, another ultimate reality admitted by the Samkhya is purusa, the 
principle of pure consciousness. Purusa is the soul, the self, the sprit, the 
subject, the knower. It is neither body nor senses nor brain nor mind (manas) 
nor ego (ahamkara) nor intellect (buddhi). It is not a substance which possesses 
the quality of consciousness. Consciousness is its essence. It is itself pure and 
transcendental consciousness. It is the ultimate knower which is the basis of all 
knowledge. It is the pure subject and as such can never become an object of 
knowledge. It is the soundless spectator, the liberated alone, the neutral seer. 
the peaceful eternal. It is beyond time and space, beyond transformation and 
action. It is self shining and self proved. It is uncaused, eternal and all 
pervading. It is the definite real, the postulate of knowledge, and all doubts and 
denials presume its existence. It is called nistraigunya, udasina, akarta, kevala, 
madhyastha, saksi, drasta, sadaprakashasvarupa, and jnata (Sharma, 1960). The 
existence of the purusa must be admitted by all. Everyone feels and asserts that 
he or she exists and has this or that thing belonging to him or her. The 
sentiment of one's own existence is the most natural and definite experience 
that we all have. In fact, no one can constantly reject the existence of his self 
for the act of denial presupposes the reality of the denying self So it has been 
said by the Samkhyites that the purusa exists, because it is self-manifest and its 
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non-existence cannot be proven in any way (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). 
Therefore, the Samkhya philosophy has advanced a number of arguments for 
the existence of purusa. These arguments are, no doubt, essential in the context 
of the Samkhya philosophy because by the assistance of these arguments the 
Samkhya philosophers attempts to establish one of the basic metaphysical 
entities in their philosophy namely, purusa or the pure conscious subject. These 
arguments are presented in different forms by various Samkhya writers. These 
arguments are advanced by Isvarakrsna in his Samkhya Karika; although, these 
arguments of Isvarakrsna will be also taken up along with the commentaries of 
both Gaudapada and Vacaspati Misra: 
"Samghatapararthatvat, trigunadiviparyayadadhisthanat 
Purusosti, bhokrbhavat, kaivalyartham pravrttesca" 
The translation of the above passage is stated as; "because all compound 
objects are for another's use, because there must be absence of the three 
attributes and other properties, because there must be control, because there 
must be some to experience and because there is a tendency towards separation 
or final beatitude, consequently, the spirit must be there" (Kar, 1985). 
These arguments may be explicated as under: 
(1) Sanghata Pararthatvat: All unruffled objects are intended for someone 
else. The unconscious prakrti cannot make use of them; therefore all these 
substances are for purusa. The body, sense organs, mind and intellect are 
merely the tools of the purusa the three gunas, prakrti and the subtle body, all 
serve the purpose of the purusa. Evolution is teleological. Its purpose is to work 
for the purusa. It is only in order that the purusa may realize its purpose that 
prakrti manifests itself in the form of the universe. 
(2) Trigunadi Viparyayata: All substances are composed of three gunas. 
Therefore, it is essential for the purusa also to coexist. Purusa is the spectator of 
these gunas and is himself beyond them. The things unruffled of the three 
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gunas prove the existence of the purusa who is not made of the three gunas and 
is far from them. 
(3) Adhisthanat: There should be a pure consciousness, which is beyond 
experience and which is capable of synthesizing, of creating harmony amid all 
the experiences. All knowledge depends upon the knower. Purusa is the 
substratum of all realistic knowledge. He must be present in all kinds of 
assertion and negation. There can be no experience without him. 
(4) Bhoktribhavat: Unconscious prakrti cannot make use of its own creations. 
A conscious element is required to make use of them. Prakrti is the one to be 
enjoyed; therefore, there must be someone to enjoy it. All the objects of the 
world create either pain or pleasure or apathy, but there must be some 
conscious element to experience these three types of feelings. This establishes 
the existences of purusa. 
(5) Kaivalyarth Pravritteh: In the world there are numerous individuals who 
venture to gain liberty from the pain and annoyance of the world. For the 
desires of salvation to exist, persons are required who may desire for salivation 
and make an attempt to achieve it. For there to be any prayer, there must be 
someone to pray. Therefore, it is essential to accept the existence of the purusa 
(Sharma, 2006). 
Classical Samkhya taught that there is a multitude of purusas, something that is 
explicitly stated in the Samkhya Karika, "the souls are many since birth, death 
and the instruments of cognition and action allotted severally, in view of the 
fact that occupations are not concurrent and at once universe; since the three 
attributes affect severally" (Mainkar, 1964). Evidently this is not a completely 
persuasive argument, but it is clear that what is meant here is that there are as 
many purusas as there are individual selves. The commentarial tradition on the 
Samkhya Karika agrees with this, but adds little of substance besides directing 
the similar argument towards other theoretical schools. I found that the 
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Patanjala Yoga School seems to presume the same (Larson, 2008). Unlike 
Advaita Vedanta and like Jainism and Mimamsa, Samkhya believes in the (as I 
have already mentioned) plurality of the purusas. Like the Jivas of the Jainas, 
the souls of Ramanuja and the monads of Leibnitz, the Samkhya purusas are 
subject to qualitative monism and quantitative pluralism. The selves are all 
fiandamentally similar; only numerically are they dissimilar. Their essence is 
consciousness. Bliss is regarded as diverse from consciousness and is the 
product of the sattva guna. Samkhya gives the three arguments for proving the 
plurality of the purusas (Sharma, 1960). And the following arguments are given 
to prove the pluralistic concept of purusas and they are to be found in the 
Samkhya Karika: 
(1) Janana-marana Karananam Pratiniyamat: The birth, death and sensory 
activities of all human beings are different. One is blind while another has two 
eyes. This distinction is probable only when there are more than one purusa 
otherwise all would have died when one die and all would have been blinded 
when one becomes so. But such is not the experience of daily life; therefore, 
there is a plurality of purusas. 
(2) Ayugapat Pravritescha: All individuals are not possessed of the same 
tendencies. A dissimilar propensity is to be found in every different individual. 
Even in the same individual one may find a affirmative propensity at a 
particular moment and a pessimistic propensity at another. In this way, the 
failure to find a concurrence of tendencies leads to the end that there are several 
purposes. If there were only one purusa then all beings should have possessed 
with the same single propensity at one occasion. 
(3) Traigunyaviparyayat: But every individual in the world is found to have 
diverse combinations of the three gunas. Every object in the world contains 
sattva, rajas and tamas, that is, the three gunas. Still one individual is sattvic, 
another rajasic and yet another tamasic. Those who are sattvic have peace, 
luminosity and pleasure. Those who are rajasic or have a prevalence of rajas. 
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have pain, disturbance and anger. While the tamasic, are ignorant and prone to 
attachment. If there were only one purusa then all would have been sattvic, 
rajasic or tamasic. But such does not emerge to be the case. Therefore, there are 
many purusas (Vatsyayan, 11* revised edition). 
It is worth pointing out that in spite of this homogeneity there are indications 
that in the era previous the composition of the Samkhya Karika there was not 
nearly so much concurrence and that an amount of different proto-Samkhya 
teachers and schools (or sub-schools) had a number of opinions on the matter 
prior to the period in which numerous purusas and a single prakrti was agreed 
upon (Nicholson, 2010). 
Samkhya Dualism: 
I have realized during my research work that the Samkhya philosophy is 
dualistic. According to the Samkhya philosophy, prakrti and purusa are of 
completely paradoxical natures, as is also apparent from the preceding 
description of their nature. Prakrti and purusa are entirely independent and 
absolute (Sharma, 2006). Consequently, Samkhya philosophy is best described 
a form of substance dualism. This form of substance dualism has a dissection 
among consciousness and matter, which is seen as independent from one 
another and relying on one another at the same time (Schweizer, 1993). This 
division is explained in numerous ways, such as; thoughts and feelings versus 
intellect, nature versus soul, non-eternal versus eternal, non-spiritual versus 
spiritual, and impure versus pure to name a few. The most important division 
associated with Samkhya philosophy is among the entity purusa and the entity 
prakrti. The other listed divisions are used to describe purusa and prakrti. In 
order to comprehend Samkhya philosophy it is essential to understand that 
purusa and prakrti are two separate elements of consciousness (Majumdar, 
1926(a) and Everett, 1899). 
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However, purusa and prakrti are not and cannot be independent from one 
another. "Purusa has the power of perceiving, but no power of acting, while 
Prakrti has the power of acting, but no power of perceiving". This quote 
explains the guidance versus activity relationship that purusa and prakrti share. 
Furthermore, this quote shows the point that purusa needs prakrti just as prakrti 
needs purusa. The unification among purusa and prakrti is requisite to move 
through one's life (Majumdar, 1925). Although purusa and prakrti are unified, 
each has different features of their own. Prakrti is in reference to objects, 
matter, all material that includes the mind and body. Ahamkara means inner 
instrument and refers to the three components of the mind, which is related to 
prakrti. The first component is manas, which means mind. Manas, is described 
as cognition, perception, and intelligence. The second component is buddhi, 
which means intellect. Buddhi is described as a high level of intellect function 
that uses instinct, insight, and reflection. The final component is ahamkara, 
which means ego. Ahamkara is described as what claims possession and what 
makes something personal (Schweizer, 1993). Prakrti alone is subconscious, 
but is competent of consciousness through the influence of purusa. This is 
clarified through an example; "fire bums only when in contact with a 
flammable object", prakrti is the fire and purusa being what makes fire blaze 
(Majumdar, 1926(b)). In view of the fact that prakrti is chiefly in reference to 
the subconscious it is comprehensible that purusa is chiefly in reference to 
consciousness. Every entity is thought to have their own purusa and each 
purusa is unique from the next, but all purusas have comparable descriptions 
(Majumdar, 1925). Purusa is explained as consciousness, intellect, the subject 
and the soul (Schweizer, 1993 and Everett, 1899). A glance at the 
characteristics of both prakrti and purusa gives additional knowledge in 
interpreting the Samkhya philosophical view of prakrti and purusa's 
amalgamation with each other. The amalgamation among prakrti and purusa is 
furthermore described through the notion of 'bandha' (bondage). There are 
three types of pain related to bondage. These pains are intrinsic, extrinsic, and 
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supernatural. The pains arise from purusa's experience with prakrti. Purusa is 
eternally bound and never detached from prakrti. Prakrti is sentiments, 
possessions, desires, needs, etc. Purusa is inspired with prakrti. Purusa is an 
elapsed self and only recognizes itself united with what prakrti is. Desolation is 
what results from the illusion of what purusa recognizes itself as. According to 
the Samkhya philosophy there are different types of knowledge. The illusion 
that purusa has of what it recognizes itself as is due to avidya, which means 
false knowledge. The false knowledge that purusa holds is that it wants to 
detach itself from prakrti and recognize itself as an individual entity. However, 
separation of prakrti and purusa is impossible. What must happen is a change 
of one's viewpoint. This can be attained through vidya, which is discriminative 
knowledge or the knowledge of dissimilarity. Vidya can be found through 
broad religious teachings and practices. When vidya is achieved it is then 
probable to see that prakrti and purusa are both identical and separate. 
Furthermore, the relationship among prakrti and purusa is relative not absolute 
(Majumdar, 1926(a)). The amalgamation of prakrti and purusa is not ideal. The 
Samkhya philosophy comments on the inadequate amalgamation by reflecting 
that things do not instigate as perfect, but have the possibility to become perfect 
(Majumdar, 1926(b)). The aim is to attain liberation. However, liberation 
cannot be attained through just one life. Liberation may be attained through 
many lives of true knowledge (Majumdar, 1926(a)). The amalgamation of 
prakrti and purusa in Samkhya philosophy view is equal to creation. The 
creation of this amalgamation allows one to move through one's life. This is 
done by means of activities and guidance interacting with one another. Prakrti 
produces purposeful actions because it has the aspiration to release purusa, but 
this is only made probable because purusa guides prakrti to do so. Although, 
this is simply practicable after purusa has had absolute contentment of 
knowledge and enjoyment by prakrti. Only then can liberation come 
(Majumdar, 1925). Since Samkhya philosophy considers the union of prakrti 
and purusa as creation and a beginning that consists of imperfection, Samkhya 
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philosophy also considers the union o^afe^-«(Wir^urusa as evolution. The 
viewpoint of prakrti and purusa being referred to as evolution comes from the 
various experiences purusa goes through with prakrti (Majumdar, 1926(a)). 
Therefore, evolution and distortion in the constituent elements takes place as 
soon as the purusa comes into close propinquity with the prakrti. But purusa 
never gets tied dov^n or attached to the universe because he is eternally 
liberated (Sharma, 2006). 
As with any other belief system, this philosophy is not different in 
acknowledging that every experience brings transformation and escalation. The 
distinction, although, is that this philosophy views that transformation and 
escalation is done through many lives fiill of various experiences and 
attainment of knowledge, not just one life's v,'orth of experiences and 
knowledge (Majumdar, 1926(a)). However, the Samkhya system has made 
intensive effort to establish some sort of relation among prakrti and purusa; it 
has failed to determine their dualism (Sharma, 2006). 
2. Samkhya Epistemology: 
Knowledge is made possible by the instrumentation of the psychic medium 
which is vitti. So what is recognized directly is the form of the object which the 
vrtti has assumed and not the object itself. This does not mean that Samkhya 
favours subjective idealism; for, according to it, all knowledge has necessarily 
an extra mental reference. The vrtti doses not take the place of the object; it 
simply serves as a connecting relation among the knowing subject and the 
known object (Mahadevan, 1974). 
The Samkhya epistemology follows in the main its dualistic metaphysics. 
Samkhya accepts only three independent source of valid knowledge (pramana). 
These are perception, inference and scriptural testimony (sabda). The other 
sources of knowledge like comparison, postulation (arthapatti) and non-
cognition (anupalabdhi) are included under these three, and not recognized as 
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separate sources of knowledge. Valid knowledge (prama) is a definite and 
certain cognition of some object (arthaparicchitti) through the modification of 
buddhi or the intellect which reflects the consciousness of the self in it. What 
we call the mind is an unconscious material entity in the Samkhya philosophy. 
Consciousness or intelligence (caitanya) actually belongs to the self But the 
self cannot instantly apprehend the objects of the world. If it could we should 
always know all objects, since the self in us is not infinite and imperfect but all 
pervading. The self knows the objects through the intellect, the manas and the 
senses. We have a true knowledge of objects when, through the activity of the 
senses and the manas, their forms are impressed on the intellect which, in its 
turn reflects the light or consciousness of the self in all valid knowledge there 
are three factors, namely, the subject (pramata), the object (pramey) and the 
ground or source of knowledge (pramana). The subject being a conscious 
principle is no other than the self as pure consciousness (suddha cetana). The 
change (vrtti) of the intellect through which the self knows an object is called 
pramana. The object present to the self through this modification is the 
prameya. Prama or valid knowledge is the reflection of the self in the intellect 
as modified into the form of the object, because without the self^s 
consciousness the unconscious intellect cannot cognise anything (Chatterjee 
and Datta, 2007). The Samkhya account of these avenues of knowledge is 
approximately similar as that of the Nyaya (Mahadevan, 1974), and these are 
described as under: 
(A) Perception (Pratyaksa): Perception is the direct cognition of an object 
through its contact with some sense (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007).The Samkhya, 
as does the Nyaya, recognises two stages in perception; (I) Indeterminate 
(nirvikalpaka) and (II) Determinate (savikalpaka). But the description of these 
offered by it is dissimilar from that of the other system. Indeterminate 
perception, here, is not the perception of isolated elements which are 
synthesised at the level of determinate perception. Perception is, at first, an 
indistinct consciousness which later becomes clear and distinct through 
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investigation, synthesis and understanding. So, the Samkhya does not favour 
the mosaic theory of knowledge. According to it, knowledge is to be compared 
with organic escalation from the simple to the complex, from the implicit to the 
explicit. The perceptual process is explained thus; the senses perceive objects 
indeterminately and bring such perceptions to the manas (mind, as one of the 
faculties of the internal organ), which synthesises them and takes them to 
ahamkara (egoity). Egoity refers the percepts to the self which commissions the 
buddhi (intellect) to determine their nature. For instance, the procedure is 
related to the system of revenue collection. The village accountant collects the 
taxes from the landholders and dispatched them to the mayor, who in his turn 
remits them to the governor. It is the function of the governor to see to it that 
the collected taxes reach the king's treasury (Mahadevan, 1974). There is 
another example which may obviously describe the processes of perception, 
when an object like the table comes within the range of our vision; there is 
contact between the table and our eyes. The table produces certain impressions 
or modifications in the sense organs, which are analysed and synthesised by 
manas or the mind. Through the activity of the senses and the mind, buddhi or 
the intellect becomes modified and transformed into the shape of the table. 
(B) Inference (Anumana): Inference is the knowledge of one term of a 
relation, which is not perceived, through the other which is perceived and 
known to be perpetually associated with the first. In it what is perceived leads 
us on to the knowledge of what is unperceived through the knowledge of a 
universal relation (vyapti) among the two. We get the knowledge of vyapti 
amid two things from the frequent examination of their concomitance. One 
single illustration of their relation is not, as some logicians wrongly think, 
adequate to ascertain the knowledge of a universal link among them. With 
regard to the classification of inference, the Samkhya adopts the Nyaya view, 
although in somewhat different form (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). The 
classification of inference is into vita and avita. The vita type is that where 
there is affirmative concomitance among hetu (probans) and sadhya (pro-
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bandum). There are two varieties of vita inference; (a) purvavat and (b) 
samanyato-drsta. The former is based on experimental concomitance of the 
definite probans and prabandum, as, for instance, of smoke and fire. The 
concomitance is recognized through similarity. Such inference is called 
samanyato-drsta. The example, it is inferred that the perception of sound, 
colour etc, requires the functioning of sense organs. Neither the sense organs 
nor their functions are objects of perception. The inference is based on the 
similarity among the perception of colour etc, on the one hand, and other acts, 
such as cutting etc, on the other, which latter are objects of perception. The 
analysis is this; just as the act of cutting requires an instrumental cause, the 
perception of colour etc, requires the functioning of sense organs. Avita 
inference is otherwise recognized as sesavat and is essentially pessimistic in 
character. It is based on the co-absence of the probandum and the probans. In 
this type of inference, no affirmative instance is available and only pessimistic 
instances may be cited. I have illustrated that the effect is non-different from 
the cause (cloth is non-different from threads), because the effect is seen to 
inhere in the cause as a property thereof. No affirmative instances can be given, 
because all instances will fall within what is sought to be proved. So, I have to 
argue only in a pessimistic way. If the effect and the cause were dissimilar, 
inherence would not be possible, as, for example, between cow and horse. But, 
there is inherence among effect (cloth) and cause (threads); therefore, they are 
non-different (Mahadevan, 1974). 
(C) Testimony (Sabda): According to the Samkhya philosophy the third 
pramana is testimony or sabda. It is constituted by the reliable statements 
(aptavacana) and gives the knowledge of objects which cannot be recognized 
by perception and inference. A statement is a sentence made up of words 
arranged in a definite way. A word is a symbol which denotes something 
(vacya). That is, a word is a sign which stands for some objects. The 
understanding of a sentence requires the understanding of the meanings of its 
component words. Testimony or sabda is commonly said to be of two khids; 
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namely, (a) Laukika and (b) Vaidika. The first is the testimony of ordinary 
reliable persons. This, although, is not known in the Samkhya as a separate 
pramana, since it depends on perception and inference. It is the testimony of 
Sruti or the Vedas that is to be admitted as the third independent pramana. For 
instance, the Vedas provide us true knowledge about super-sensuous realities 
which cannot be recognized through perception and inference. As not made by 
any individual, the Vedas are free from all faults and imperfections that must 
adhere to the works of individual agencies. They are, consequently, perfect and 
possess self manifest validity (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). Testimony is valid 
when the source is trustworthy. It may come not only from scripture but also 
from individuals who are reliable. Hence, the above three means of valid 
knowledge is known by the Samkhya (Mahadevan, 1974). 
3. Samkhya Doctrine of liberation: 
Like other systems of Indian philosophy, the Samkhya aims at the achievement 
of liberation, analyses the causes of bondage and suggests solutions (Sharma, 
2006). Our life on earth is an assortment of happiness and sadness. There are 
certainly numerous pleasures of life and also several creatures that have a good 
share of them. But many more are the pains and sufferings of life and all living 
beings are more or less subject to them. Even if it be possible for any human 
being to avoid all other pains and miseries, it is not possible for him to avoid 
the authorities of perish and bereavement. Typically, however, we are the 
victims of three kinds of pain, viz.; (a) the Adhyatmika, (b) Adhibhautika and 
(c) Adgudauvuja (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). According to the Samkhya 
system, where there is guna there is suffering. Sufferings have their end in 
liberation. Even the life of heaven is controlled by the gunas. The endeavour of 
man is to get rid of three kinds of suffering. The one by one detailed 
descriptions of the three kinds of sufferings referred above are as under: 
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(1) Adhyatmika: This kind of pain is due to physical, mental and intra-organic 
causes. It includes all types of bodily and mental ailments. Disease, anger and 
hunger, etc., are adhyamika sufferings. 
(2) Adhibhautika: This kind of pain is induced by natural causes such as 
human beings, animals, birds, insects, etc. They are caused by external physical 
objects and are extra-organic. 
(3) Adhidaivika: This kind of pain is proceeded from external but 
extraordinary causes such as stars, physical elements, ghosts, witches, etc., 
(Sharma, 2006). 
Now everybody intently desires to evade every kind of pain. Nay more, they 
desire, once for all, to put an end to all their sufferings and have pleasure at all 
times. But that is not to be. We cannot have enjoyment only and eliminate the 
pain on the whole. So, as long as we are in this fragile body with its flawed 
organs, all enjoyments are bound to be mixed up with pain or, at least, be 
impermanent. Thus we should give up the hedonistic ideal of happiness and 
rest content with the attractive but more logical end of liberty from pain. In the 
Samkhya system, liberation (mukti) is just the absolute and complete cessation 
of all pain without a possibility of return. It is the ultimate and or the summum 
bonum of our life (apavarga or purusartha) (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). 
Way to liberation (Moksa): 
The way to liberation (kaivalya) is the knowledge of reality (Kumar, 1984). 
That is to say, that true knowledge of metaphysics is the method of obtaining 
liberation from suffering. Ignorance is the cause of suffering. Ignorance means 
the failure to know one's own real nature. Not knowing the real nature of soul, 
the living being identifies itself with the mind, ego and intellect and is affected 
by their pleasure and pain and hence it suffers. When the jiva recognizes and 
realizes its real nature or the inner real self, it then ceases to be influenced by 
the sufferings of ego, intellect and the mind. In this v/ay liberation can be 
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achieved only by realizing the difference among prakrti and purusa (Sharma, 
2006). It has been said in the Samkhya philosophy, that just as the science of 
medicine consists of four parts viz.; (1) Disease, (2) Cause of disease, (3) 
Freedom from the disease and (4) Medicine, likewise, this science of moksa, 
that is, the philosophy of Samkhya, also consists of four parts which are; (1) 
World, (2) Cause of the world, (3) Liberation and (4) Way to liberation. Of 
them, the first; the world is full of desolation is worth giving up, the second; 
the propinquity of prakrti and purusa is the cause of this world to be given up, 
the third; the absolute elimination of proximity is liberation and the fourth; the 
way to liberation is the knowledge of reality. The question now arises as, what 
is the way to liberation, that is, to the knowledge of reality which demolishes 
ignorance and why it has been regarded as the way to liberation. It has been 
said in Samkhya Karika in this connection that pure and real knowledge, 
devoid of all delusions etc., arises by the practice of concentration on reality. 
According to Samkhyatattvakaumudi, the reality is the fact that purusa is 
distinct from prakrti and by its incessant and long practice with belief arise 
knowledge, pure and real, without illusions, etc., in the form; 'nasmi', that is I 
possess no action, 'naham', that is I am not a doer and 'na me', that is I do not 
possess anything anywhere. This is the direct perception of reality. The 
sentence 'nasmi' that is, 'I possess no action' rejects all kinds of actions m 
purusa. Thus all the actions, interior and exterior, performed by buddhi, 
ahamkara, manas and indriyas should be understood to be not possessed by 
purusa. In the absence of actions, there is the absence of doer-ship (kartrtva) 
also and hence it has been said that 'naham' that is, I am not a doer; simply a 
doer becomes a possessor (svamin) and therefore purusa, on account of the 
absence of doer-ship, cannot also be a possessor and hence it has been said 'na 
me' that is, I am not a possessor. A question can be raised that the knowledge 
of reality arises by the practice of reality, but the wrong knowledge will 
persevere on account of the imitations of the beginning-less ignorance and 
hence there will be no end to the world that is the sequence of birth and death 
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caused by ignorance. Vacaspati Misra, in his commentary on Samkhya Karika, 
says that, though the intuition of ignorance is beginning-less, it is entirely 
shattered by the knowledge of reality, because the buddhi has a nature of going 
towards reality. Vacaspati Misra has also quoted from Pramana-vartika to 
support his statement, "nirupadrava-bhutartha-svabhavasya viparyayaih, na 
badha yatna-vatve pi buddhes tat-paksapatatah", that is, due to the obliteration 
of the mound of evil, the real nature, having achieved the unhindered and real 
knowledge of objects, cannot be hindered by wrong knowledge, even if 
attempted to do so, because buddhi has a natural bent to go towards that reality. 
Thus after the knowledge of reality is achieved, there remains nothing to be 
known, the ignorance of which may cause bondage to beings. Only knowledge 
or reality has been spoken of as the way to moksa or liberation in Samkhya 
philosophy (Kumar, 1984). 
Jivan-Mukti and Videha-Mukti: 
Samkhya philosophers have accepted both jivan-mukti (liberation during life) 
as well as videha-mukti (liberation after death) (Sharma, 2006). A point worth 
reflection is that if a seeker is liberated as soon as he achieves the knowledge of 
reality, his body should plunge down just after the recognition of reality. Thus, 
on the achievement of the knowledge of reality, the impressions of actions 
which had so far not started producing pleasure of their fruits lose their power 
of producing fruits due to the warmth of the knowledge of reality. But the 
impressions of the actions which had started producing the pleasure of their 
fruits by the time there is the growth of the knowledge of reality can be 
shattered merely by pleasure. The knower, thus, continues to bear his body due 
to the impressions of the action which have started giving fruits, just as the 
potter's wheel continues to spin due to the impression of the preceding force, 
even after the stoppage of the action of rotating by the potter (Kumar, 1984). 
Therefore, jivan-mukti or freedom while still alive, in short, is that, when a 
person has become entirely enlightened and has transcended all the weaknesses 
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of human flesh. Such a person, when he departs this life, must no doubt 
continue to be, purusa being considered immortal; but it then remains as pure 
spirit, utterly liberated from nature (Hiriyanna, 1949). Also in the Yogabhasya, 
it is stated that the knower becomes liberated during his life on the obliteration 
of afflict (klesa) actions. Such a man is liberated when alive and is therefore 
called jivan-mukti that is liberated during life. He is alive due to the 
continuance of his body and is liberated due to the achievement of the 
discriminatory knowledge (Kumar, 1984). But ultimate and absolute liberation 
is possible only after death and in this there is no relation even with the body. 
This is called videhamukti. In this state, absolute liberation is achieved after 
liberty from all types of bodies, subtle and gross, has been acquired. According 
to Vijnanabhiksu, videhamukti is the only kind of liberation because as long as 
the body detains the soul, the latter is not totally liberated from mental and 
physical distortions. According to the Vedanta, liberation is a state of bliss. 
According to the Samkhya, both pain or suffering and pleasure are relative and 
indivisible. Hence, there is no bliss in the state of liberation. It is above 
pleasure and suffering. It is beyond all qualities. 
Both liberation and bondage have only practical reality; according to the 
Samkhya philosophy, the difference among liberation and bondage is only 
practical (Sharma, 2006). That is to say that, Samkhya considers that bondage 
and liberation alike are merely phenomenal. The bondage of the purusa is 
fiction. It is only the ego, the product of prakrti, which is bound. And 
consequently it is only the ego which is liberated. Purusa, in its absolute 
separation, is untouched by bondage and liberation. If purusa were really 
bound, it could not have acquired liberation even after hundred births, for real 
bondage can never be shattered. It is prakrti which is bound and prakrti which 
is liberated. Isvarakrsna candidly says that; purusa, thus, is really neither bound 
nor is it liberated nor does it transmigrates; bondage, liberation and 
transmigration belongs to prakrti in its various forms. Prakrti binds itself with 
its seven forms. There is nothing finer and subtler than prakrti; she is so shy 
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that she never reappears before that purusa who has once seen her in her true 
colours. Just as a dancing girl retires from the stage after entertaining the 
spectators, likewise prakrti also retires after exhibiting herself to the purusa 
(Sharma, 1960). 
At last, when the ignorance is shattered by discriminatory knowledge, the 
contact of prakrti and purusa is eternally removed and hence desolation is also 
eternally removed. This is the moksa of prakrti and kaivalya of purusa. All the 
gunas in the cause-effect from dissolve into their original cause the prakrti. 
Vacaspati Misra has described in detail that in this state, the impressions of the 
working state of the samprajnata-samadhi and of the asamprajnata-samadhi 
dissolve into manas, manas into ahamkara, ahamkarainto buddhi, and buddhi 
into prakrti and therefore, all the gunas dissolve into their respective causes. 
Looking from the point of view of prakrti and that of purusa, moksa is taken to 
be of two kinds, viz.; (1) the moksa of prakrti which means that prakrti, having 
accomplished its purpose with respect to purusa, does not offer itself for 
pleasure again and (2) the kaivalya of purusa which means that the purusa, 
having achieved the discriminatory knowledge, does not take the enjoyments 
by buddhi as his own, that is his enjoyments are stopped (Kumar, 1984). 
4. God and Ethics: 
I have seen during my research, how the elements of the Samkhya system w ere 
subordinated in the Upanishads and in the Bhagavad-Gita to an idealistic 
theism. While Epic philosophy borrowed the cosmogony and the theory of the 
absolute passivity of purusa from the Samkhya, it did not regard purusa and 
prakrti as self-sufficient realities, but represented them as modes of one 
ultimate Brahman (Radhakrishnan, 1923, Vol.2). The approach of the Samkhya 
towards theism has been the question of controversy among its commentators 
and interpreters. While few of them clearly reject the belief in God, others take 
great pains to make out that the Samkhya is no less theistic than the Nyaya 
(Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). The original Samkhya was monistic and theistic 
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But the classical Samkhya maybe under the influence of Materialism, Jainism 
and early Buddhism, became atheistic. It is orthodox because it believes in the 
authority of the Vedas. It does not ascertain the non-existence of God. It simply 
shows that prakrti and purusa are adequate to describe this universe and thus 
there is no reason for postulating a hypothesis of God. But the later Samkhya 
writers like Vijnanabhiksu have tried to revive the necessity for admitting God 
(Sharma, 1960). The classical Samkhya argues against the existence of God on 
the following grounds: 
(I) The world as a system of effects must have a cause, is no doubt true. But 
God or Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. God is said to be the eternal 
and immutable self and what is static cannot be the active cause of anything. So 
it follows that the ultimate cause of the world is the eternal but ever changing 
(parinami) prakrti or matter. 
(II) It may be said that prakrti being non-intelligent must be controlled and 
directed by some intelligent agents to create the world. The individual selves 
are imperfect in knowledge and thus, cannot control the subtle material cause 
of the world. So there must be an infinitely wise being, which is God, who 
directs and guides prakrti. But this is indefensible. God, as conceived by the 
theists, does not act or v/ield Himself in any way; but to control and guide 
prakrti is to act or do something. 
(III) The belief in God is conflicting with the idiosyncratic reality and 
immorality or individual selves (ji^a). If the latter be integrated within God as 
His parts, they must have some of the divine powers which, however, is not the 
case. On the other hand, if they are created by God, they must be obliteration 
(Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). 
Consequently, the Samkhya in its classical form is absolutely atheistic. It 
believes in the permanence and superiority of spirit, but knows nothing of God. 
Here it shows its rationalistic partiality, for no persuasive rational proof, as is 
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recognized can be given of his existence. The Samkhya, no doubt, like the 
other Indian systems, is basically a philosophy of values. But according to its 
teachers, all that is presupposed by the reality of the elevated or eternal values 
are the immortality of the individual spirit. This is well indicated by the manner 
in which the teleological argument, previously referred to, is utilized here. It is 
regarded not as implying a designer, but as pointing to one who benefits by the 
design. The Samkhya concludes from the presence in nature of means adapted 
to the achievement of ends, not God as their author, but to the self for whom it 
supposes them to exist. It therefore accepts design, but refutes a conscious 
designer (Hiriyanna, 1949). Even though the Samkhya system refutes the 
existence of God (Isvara) or any other external influence and holds that there is 
an intrinsic propensity in these realms which guides all their actions. This 
propensity or teleology demands that the actions of the realms should be m 
such a way that they may provide some service to the souls either in the 
direction of pleasure or salvation (Dasgupta, 1922). Therefore God is not 
necessary for creating the world, for the world is an evolution from prakrti. 
Prakrti does not necessitate a prime mover, because it is self-moving. Nor is 
God essential for giving the souls their deserts or guiding them to liberation; 
karma executes the former and endeavour in the way of bias accomplishes the 
latter. The classical Samkhya sees no logical justification for postulating a God 
for explaining the pertinent facts to the world of nature and the realm of spirit 
(Mahadevan, 1974). 
The Samkhyites which are apprehensive to abide within the authoritarian limits 
of knowledge holds that the reality of God cannot be recognized by rational 
proofs. There is no reasonable proof or inferential knowledge or scriptural 
testimony of Isvara. The Samkhyites are not atheistic in the sense that it 
establishes that there is no God. It merely shows that there is no cause for 
supposing there is one. The passages which are in fact theistic in the scriptures 
are really eulogies of liberated souls. The old Gods of the Vedic hymns manage 
to live under the auspices of the rationalistic Samkhya. They are, although, not 
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eternal in nature. The Samkhya accepts the theory of a Vyavasthapaka Isvara, 
who, at the time of creation, arranges the consecutive developments of prakrti, 
Siva, Visnu, etc., are regarded as phenomenal. The Samkhya admits the 
existence of a sprouting Isvara previously engrossed in prakrti. The souls, who, 
through the practice of un-attachment to mahat, etc., become engrossed in 
prakrti, are said to be all-knower and all-doers. These are the features we 
commonly attributes to God, but as the Samkhya holds that prakrti is constantly 
beneath the rule of others, these Gods are not independent (Radhakrishnan, 
1923, Vol.2). Later Samkhya thinkers like Vijnanabhiksu sought to find a place 
for God in the system. But even in the late Sutras there does not seem to be an 
apprehension to accommodate God. There is no reference to God in the 
Samkhya Karika (Mahadevan, 1974). Vijnanabhiksu also thinks that the 
existence of God is supported by reason as well as by the scriptures. 
The conclusion pinched from the above all statements reveal that God does not 
exist and the prakrti is the sufficient reason for there being a world of objects. 
Prakrti creates the world unconsciously for the good of the individual selves 
(purusa) in the same way in which the milk of the cow flows unconsciously 
through her udder for the nourishment of the calf (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). 
As I have already pointed out that, the Samkhya starts with the idea of the 
universality of suffering, which is of three kinds; adhyatmika; that is, arising 
from the psychological nature of man, adhibhautika; that is, arising from the 
exterior world, and the adhidaivika; that is, arising from the supernatural 
agencies. Every individual strives to lighten and if possible get rid of pain. But 
pain cannot be rooted out by the remedies prescribed by the science of 
medicine or the scriptures. Liberation is not achievable by the performance of 
Vedic rites. Like Buddhism and Jainism, the Samkhya urges that the Vedic 
rites involve a violation of the great moral principles. The law of ahimsa is set 
apart when we slay an animal for the Agni-stoma scarifies. Homicide is prolific 
of sin, even though it be in scarifies. Moreover, the sort of heaven we get to by 
the act of scarifies is an impermanent one. Life in heaven (svarga) is not 
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excused from the influence of the three gunas. By the practice of virtue and the 
act of sacrifices we only adjourn the iniquity but do not get rid of it. We cannot 
run away firom evils by death, since the identical destiny pursues us life after 
life. If the miseries are natural to the soul, there is no assistance for us if they 
are merely unintentional and arise from something else, we can escape 
suffering by separating ourselves from the source of suffering. The ethical life 
is vested in the subtle body which accompanies the purusa from birth to birth; 
pain is the essence of physical existence. When the soul is left alone, it is said 
to be purified. The highest good, which the jiva aims at and strives for, is to 
understand the accomplishment of the purusa. All ethical actions are for the 
fuller realisation of the purusa in us. The circuit of samsara is one of 
inconsistency and transformation, made up of parts that are unresponsive and 
exterior to each other. The jiva, in its incessant revolutions, is ever seeking and 
ever failing to reach to unity with itself that is achieve to the status of purusa, 
which is eternally one with itself and absolute in itself, having no basic relation 
with anything exterior to it. Every jiva has in it the elevated purusa, and to 
understand its true nature has no need to go out itself, but simply to become 
conscious of its real nature. The ethical process is not the development of 
something new, but a rediscovery of what we have elapsed. Ethical virtues 
assist us to realise the deeper consciousness, although vices involve a 
darkening of this consciousness. By indulging in vices the soul immerses itself 
more and more utterly in the material body (Radhakrishnan, 1923, Vol.2). 
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Theory of Gunas in Samkhya Philosophy: 
Before I proceed to discuss Samkhya theory of gunas, I would like to discuss 
here briefly Samkhya theory of change, because it is associated with gunas. 
The philosophy of nature of the Samkhya School is founded on the theory of 
'parinama' (change) of the un-manifest prakrti (primal nature) into the manifest 
or the phenomenal world. As this is a change from the most undifferentiated to 
the most differentiated state of existence, it may also be called an 
'evolutionary' process. This process is made possible by the three "gunas" 
(Rao, April 1963), namely, (I) Sattva, (II) Rajas, and (III) Tamas. Sattva is 
intelligence stuff which makes for all that is fine and light, rajas is energy stuff 
which is accountable for action, and tamas is mass stuff which accounts for all 
that is smutty and heavy. The term 'guna' in the Samkhya philosophy does not 
mean 'quality' as in the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy. The two other meanings 
of the term are; (a) 'strand' or 'rope' and (b) 'what is secondary'. The three 
gunas are like the three strands of a rope with which the souls are bound. They 
are secondary in the sense that they are, as we have designated, for the sake of 
the souls as they endow with pleasure for them and also serve to liberate them 
ultimately. The gunas are subtle entities or fine substances forming the prakrti 
intricate' they are the stuff which evolves into the different categories of 
existence (Mahadevan, 1974). 
Though the term "gunas" was interpreted in numerous ways in prehistoric 
Hindu works, not all of them distinguish the actual Samkhyites view as it came 
to be formulated in its ultimate and methodical form specified in the Samkhva 
Karika of Isvarakrsna. We can find the term gunas lending itself to various 
interpretations. There are examples of the term's being used for ethical virtues 
in the Mahabharata (Rao, April 1963). Vijnanabhiksu makes 'gunas" 
categories of reals, whereas in the Upanishads they stand for psychic states 
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which create physical and mental iniquity. The gunas are said to be enormously 
fine in quality. They are constantly changing. Even in what is regarded as the 
state of equilibrium the gunas are frequently changing into one another 
(Radhakrishnan, 1923, Vol.2). Besides, modem scholars generally embrace 
that in the Bhagavad-Gita the gunas are the fimdamental constituents of prakrti 
or the material world. The Bhagavad-Gita mentions the gunas together with 
prakrti, it frequently refers to the gunas as 'bom of prakrti' signifying that the 
gunas depend on prakrti. The term (gunas) appears various times in the 
Bhagavad-Gita and it seems that the gunas should be a matter of some 
apprehension to the practitioner. For instance, the Bhagavad-Gita (7.13) states 
gunas as: "This whole world is confused by the three states which consist of the 
gunas. Because of these they do not recognize me who am beyond these and 
imperishable". The gunas seems to be essential to the Bhagavad-Gita's 
psychology. Krishna presents a theory of personality types which differentiates 
sattvic, rajasic and tamasic people, faculties and behaviour (Stansell, 2008). 
Although, my key interest at present is not to draw all the unlike shades of 
meaning developed through the historical stages of Hindu philosophy, but to 
confine myself to the standard meaning of methodical Samkhya thought at the 
same time as I find it in the Samkhya Karika and the Commentaries thereon. 
According to methodical Samkhya, guna is an "ontological real". Taking the 
gunas in this sense of "ontological real", we shall attempt to establish their 
logical association with prakrti, a problem typically lost sight of in the common 
dialogues of the Samkhya. Even with regard to this, interpretational differences 
have occurred in the literature of the Samkhyites and related ideas. But it is 
acquiesced here that for a logical and reliable description of prakrti as an 
'evolving' principle, a distinctiveness of the gunas with prakrti is a necessity. 
Such an effort not merely alleviates the concept of its mythical nature but 
makes it metaphysical. Of all the efforts at description, such a logical 
understanding of an identity of the gunas with prakrti offers conceivably the 
most logical argument in the path of lifting the Samkhya from the domain of 
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effortless speculation and gives it scientific importance. This interpretation 
really indicated in some Samkhya texts not merely gave the system its 
philosophical prominence, but adjusted it even to satisfy the demands of 
current philosophy (Rao, April 1963). 
In later Samkhya the essential development is found that each of the three 
gunas is multiple and that the perpetuity of prakrti is due to their imprecise 
number (Hiriyanna, 1993). However, Surendranath, Dasgupta sees the genius 
of Samkhya in the descriptive power of its guna theory (as interpreted by 
Vijnanabhiksu and given an updated scientific description by Seal, B. N.), 
(Larson and Bhattacharya 1987). 
Although, gunas are infinite in number, but in accordance with their three chief 
characteristics as described above they have been arranged in three classes or 
types, and are explained as under: (Dasgupta, 1922, Vol.1). 
1. Sattva: 
During my research I found sattva the first among the three gunas. Sattva is the 
potential consciousness and consequently tends to conscious manifestation and 
causes pleasure to the individual. Etymologically, the word 'sattva' is derived 
from 'sat', or that which is real or existent. Since consciousness (caitanya) is 
generally established such existence. In a secondary sense, 'sat' also means 
rightness and so the sattva element is what produces goodness and happiness 
(Radhakrishnan, 1923, Vol.2). Sattva is also a noun buih on the participle sat, 
from as, the verb 'to be'. Sat means 'being; as it should be; good, well, perfect', 
and accordingly sattva, 'the ideal state of being; goodness, perfection, crystal 
purity, spotless clarity and absolute quiet'. The quality of sattva predominates 
in gods and divine beings, generous people, and men bent on purely spiritual 
pursuits. This is the guna that facilitates illumination (Zimmer, September 
1951). Sattva is that element of prakrti which is of the nature of pleasure and is 
buoyant or light (laghu), and bright or illuminating (prakasaka). The 
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manifestation of objects in consciousness Onana), the propensity towards 
conscious manifestation in the senses, the mind and the intellect, the brilliance 
of light and the power of reflection in a mirror or the crystal are all due to the 
actions of the element of sattva in the constitution of things. Likewise, all types 
of buoyancy in the sense of upwards motion, like the burning up of fire, the 
rising course of vapour and the zigzag motion of air, are induced in things by 
the element of sattva. As a result also pleasure in its different forms, such as 
satisfaction, joy, happiness, bliss, contentment, etc., is produced by things in 
our minds through the actions of the power of sattva inhering in them both 
(Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). According to the Samkhya philosophy, sattva is 
thought to be white in colour (Sharma, 2006 and Sharma, 1960). And it is the 
quality that is accountable for the self-manifestation and self-maintenance of 
prakrti. It also represents knowledge (Srinivas and Sastry, 2007). Therefore, 
roughly speaking that the sattva signifies whatever is pure and fine (Hiriyanna, 
1949). It also signifies the essence or the form that is to be realized (Tiwari. 
2009). Thus, onto logically speaking that, the sattva is that which makes for 
existence or being-ness. Prakrti is sattva, or itself existence. This aspect of 
prakrti expresses the Samkhya conception of realism of the objective entity, the 
prakrti, as against all schools of thought emphasizing the reality of the subject 
only (Rao, April 1963 and Burley, 2007). 
When sattva does not manifest itself the purusa cannot experience any 
cognition, for the latter can transmit its reflection on the buddhi when it 
becomes translucent and this is possible only when sattva predominates in it. 
Hence sattva serves as the intermediate for all conscious reflections of the 
purusa (Chakravarti, 1951). Sattva also emulates some of the most important 
properties of the purusa (Lysenko and Hulin, 2007). 
2. Rajas: 
This is the second among the gunas. And the following translated verses of the 
Samkhya Karika which indicates the rajas as: 
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"Through virtue one goes up, through sin one goes down; through knowledge, 
it is said, one acquires liberation, through the opposite bondage; as a result of 
passion-less-ness disbanding into nature takes place, as a result of passion, 
which is constituted of the constituent called rajas, the circle of rebirths comes 
about; as a result of power there are no obstacles, as a result of the opposite the 
invalidate situation arises" (Bronkhorst, 2000). 
Rajas or rajo-guna, which literally means foulness, is the principle of motion. It 
produces pain. Restless action, excited effort and untamed stimulation are its 
results. It is movable (chala) and stimulating (upastambhaka). Its colour is red 
(Sharma, 1960), (Sharma, 2006) and (Hulin, 1978, Vol. (VI)). Samkhyites 
holds that, rajas, is one of the gunas of prakrti. It also represents courage or 
gallantry (Srinivas, and Sastry, 2007). Rajas, is that which makes for 'change in 
itself. Prakrti is 'rajas', or that which changes. It is this aspect of prakrti which 
expresses the Samkhya conception of the dynamism of prakrti, enabling it to 
endure transformation (Rao, April 1963). As I have already pointed out, that 
rajas, is the principle of activity in things. It always moves and makes other 
things move. It is on account of rajas that fire spreads, the wind blows, the 
senses follow their objects and the mind becomes fidgety. On the emotional 
side of our life, rajas, is the cause of all painful experiences and is itself of the 
nature of pain (duhkha). It assists the elements of sattva and tamas, which are 
inactive and motionless in them-selves, to perform their functions (Chatterjee 
and Datta, 2007). And whatever is active is rajas (Hiriyanna, 1949). Rajas, is 
the active aspect of being which predominates in the organs of perception and 
action, particularly in karmendriya enabling the body to move and interact with 
environment (Jakubczak, 2008, Vol. (X)). Furthermore, Rajas means 
'impurity', in reference to the physiology of the female body 'menstruation'; 
and more commonly, 'dust'. The word is related to ranj, rakta, as well as to 
raga, 'passion'. The dust referred to be that frequently enthused up by wind in a 
land where no rain falls for at least ten months a year; for in India, except in the 
rainy season, there is nothing but the nightly dew to slake the thirst of the 
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ground. The dry soil is continually rotating into the air, dimming the 
tranquillity of the sky and coming down over everything. Consequently, rajas, 
dims the outlook on all things, obscuring the view not only of the universe but 
of oneself. Thus it produces both intellectual and moral darkness. Among 
mythical beings rajas predominates in the titans, those anti-gods or demons 
who represent the will for power in its full force, irresponsible in its pursuit of 
superiority and magnificence, panting with ambition, narcissism and arrogant 
egotism. Rajas, is evident everywhere amid men, as the attractive force of our 
struggle for existence. It is what inspires our desires, likes and dislikes, 
antagonism, and will for the pleasure of the world. It compels both men and 
beasts to struggle for the goods of life, despite of the needs and sufferings of 
others (Zimmer, September 1951). 
Rajas, represents the force by which the obstacles are surmounted and the 
important form is manifested (Tiwari, 2009). Rajas, is also dynamic and it has 
the tendency to do work by overcoming resistance (Chakravarti, 1951). As for 
the Rajas, we may look at it as reflecting the wobbly shared equilibrium of the 
two other gunas (Lysenko and Hulin, 2007). 
3. Tamas: 
This is the third among the gunas. Tamas (Latin tene-brae, French tene-bres) 
literally means, 'darkness' and 'dark-blue'; spiritually means, 'blindness', 
connotes the unconsciousness that predominates in the animals, vegetables and 
mineral kingdoms (Zimmer, September 1951), (Burley, 2007) and (Colebrooke 
and Wilson, 1837). Samkhyites considers that, the tamas or tamo-guna is black 
(dark) in colour (Sharma, 2006), (Sharma, 1960) and (Hulin, 1978, Vol. (VI)). 
Tamas also mean as mass stuff (Dasgupta, 1922, Vol.1). According to the 
Samkhya system tamas is one of the three gunas of prakrti. It is the principle 
accountable for inertia (jadatva) and it is an unresponsive nature. It serves to 
restrain (niyam) definite actions (Srinivas, and Sastry, 2007). Tamas represents 
the hindrance to its realization (Tiwari, 2009). The tamas also shows a 
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remarkable similarity towards prakrti (Lysenko and Hulin, 2007). Tamas is 
static (Chakravarti, 1951). It is the principle of passivity and pessimism in 
things. It is opposed to sattva in being heavy (guru) and in obstructing the 
manifestation of objects (varanaka) (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). It is also 
opposed to rajas as it arrests activity (Sharma, 1960). Besides, it stands for 
reliability of the impermanent (Jakubczak, 2008, Vol. (X)). It counteracts the 
power of manifestation in the mind, the intellect and other things and thereby 
produces ignorance and darkness and leads to bewilderment and confusion 
(moha). By obstructing the principle of activity in us it induces sleep, lethargy 
and laziness. It also produces the state of apathy or indifference (visada) 
(Chatterjee and Datta, 2007) and (Bronkhorst, 2000). And it leads to ignorance 
and sloth (Radhakrishnan, 1923, Vol.2). 
Therefore, roughly speaking thai, what is impassive and offers resistance is 
tamas (Hiriyanna, 1949). Tamas is the basis of all lack of feeling, dullness, 
callousness, insensibility and inertia. It causes mental obscurity, unawareness. 
fault and illusion the stolidity of apparently lifeless matter, the mute pitiless 
strife amid the plants for soil, moisture and air, the insensate voracity of 
animals in their search for food and their merciless devouring of their quarry, 
are amid the prime manifestations of this universal principle. On the human 
level, tamas is made manifest in the dreary idiocy of the more self-cantered 
and-satisfied, those who agree in whatever happens as long as their personal 
slumber, security, or interests are not disturbed. Tamas is the power that holds 
the frame of the universe together, the structure of every society and the nature 
of the individual, counter balancing the menace of self-explosion that 
continually attends the impatient dynamism of the principle of rajas (Zimmer, 
September 1951). And, lastly, tamas is that which refutes eradication through 
transformation. Prakrti is tamas, or that which restrains eradication through 
transformation. As the Samkhya Karika says, it is an energy which restrains 
(niyamartha, where artha means ability, according to Gaudapada). This aspect 
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of prakrti indicates the Samkhya opposition to all nihilistic interpretations of 
reality (Rao, April 1963). 
Therefore, three gunas (which I have previously stated) are briefly described in 
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Sattva and tamas form the optimistic and pessimistic beings, the rajas, refers to 
the struggle amid the two. The tenns sattva, rajas and tamas are employed to 
blot predominant aspects rather than elite characters (Tiwari, 2009). The nature 
of above mentioned gunas is marvellously brought out in a Hindi rhyme by 
Rasalina. The poet says that the eyes of the beloved are white, red and dark, 
and are full of nectar, intoxication and passion, with the consequence that once 
they stab the heart of the lover, he experiences the pleasure of life, the anguish 
of impatience and the inertia of death. The remembrance of the beloved gives 
him pleasure and makes life worth living; separation causes severe pain and 
makes him fidgety; intensity of love makes him forget everything and becomes 
motionless, unconscious and almost death. Sattva is white and is like nectar and 
gives pleasure; rajas, is red and is like intoxication and gives pain; tamas is 
dark and is like venom and produces unconsciousness (Sharma, 1960). As a 
consequence, sattva signifies the essence or the form which is to be realised, 
the tamas the obstacles to its realisation and rajas represents the force by which 
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the obstacles are surmount and the vital tul'lll l!, illSmfested. A thing is always 
produced, never created, according to the Samkhya theory of satkaryavada 
(causation). Production in manifestation and obliteration is non-manifestation. 
These two depend on the absence and presence of counteracting forces. A thing 
is manifested when the obstacles are removed. It is sattva or the form of the 
thing that is manifested; it is rajas that bring about the manifestation; tamas is 
the resistance to be surmount the obstruction to the manifestation of sattva. 
Everything has its ultimate essence, which it strives after, and real setting, 
which it tries to get rid of The latter is its tamasa state, the former its sattva 
state, while the process of striving represents the rajasa state (Radhakrishnan, 
1923, Vol.2). 
The phenomenal state of prakrti, that is, the disturbed condition of the 
equilibrium of the gunas, implies a changing amount of these forces which go 
to make up the diversity of the manifested world, in the following manner: 
(I) If the force making for 'existence-in-itself (sattva) predominates, the 
m.anifestation exhibits the physical features of buoyancy and enlightenment, 
and a psychological characteristic of pleasure. 
(II) If the force making for 'change-in-itself (rajas) predominates, the 
manifestation exhibits the physical features of stimulation and movement, and 
the psychological characteristics of pain and passion. (Ill) If the force making 
for 'refutation of existence through transformation' (tamas) predominates, the 
manifestation exhibits the physical features of weight and resistance or inertia, 
and the psychological characteristic of depression or dejection. These three 
forces cannot be separately conceived of any individual treatment of their 
investigation is purely academic for they jointly entail others functionally, that 
is, they jointly suppress, co-operate, produce, and exist (Rao, April 1963). 
Thus, gunas are found in varied proportions in objects and events, the 
innumerable differences of which may be traced always to the virtual excess or 
dearth of one or other of them. They join together and that is all, for every form 
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of knowable existence or appearance is adequately described by a correct 
reference to the manner of their consistency. Of this life, the broad divisions 
are waking, dreaming and dreamless or deep sleep. In waking hours, things are 
perceived much as they are the mutations of the mind following the path of 
actions outside, so rajas functions in subordination to sattva and tamas appears 
only in so far as objects are not entirely apprehended and spells of immobility 
or exhaustion alternate with the accurate ftinctioning of the other factors. In 
dreams the mind is not controlled in its modifications by facts beyond it, so that 
the succession of images and sentiments are quick and confused, transcending 
frequently the potentialities of nature. So rajas takes the lead in them and sattva 
though functioning motionless, is much under the influence of tamas. Tamas, 
again, is in control of the field in dreamless sleep. Although sattva and rajas are 
present, as appears from the conditions that we can remember how we have 
slept or waking up. It should be borne in mind in this connection that according 
to Samkhya philosophy the mind is not an entire blank in profound sleep since 
there is a indistinct consciousness of the repose of the senses and the elevated 
faculties or, to put it in technical language, a perception of the dominance of 
tamas, which from the nature of the object is essentially ill defined. Following 
the same principle, an order of preference may be laid down for the five 
cognitive senses (jnanedriyas). Sattva is evidently the chief factor in hearing 
with its pleasant bias of terrain and timbre, its wide susceptibility and its ability 
for receiving imitations from every section. Rajas, dominates in sight, because 
there is a sensation of action which becomes often painful, despite the fact that 
a sense of exhaustion is incredibly rare in hearing. Besides shades of light are 
not as cleariy distinguished as are differences of sound and the range of 
susceptibility too is narrower. Intermediate among the two is touch so far as it 
gives thermal sensation which exceed both in range and distinctions the 
impressions received through the eyes. Least in the order is the sense of smell 
which ,s pretentious by the grossest of the elements. Tamas prevails m it as the 
sensations are few and there is a lack of fine distmctions. Taste takes grade 
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above it as the sensations are so a more or less prominent feelings of 
adjustment in every case, which shows that rajas is roughly as prominent in it 
as tamas. An analogous order is obvious in the powers of voluntary movements 
and in the five forms of vital force. Sattva is the main constituents in speech, 
rajas in locomotion and tamas in reproduction, while sattva and rajas are 
approximately equally prominent in manoeuvring or putting things in their 
proper places and rajas and tamas in the eviction of waste products from the 
body. In adya-prana, sattva is more in evidence than the other two 
components, associated as it is to the five cognitive senses and to the vital 
organs that give the well defined feelings of hunger, thirst and obstructed 
respiration. 
Consequently, objects in this world are said to exist because and in so far as 
they are able to being perceived. This ability for glowing forth in the light of 
intelligence (which is sattva) which means, existence but should be rendered as 
perceptibility, the two expressions being exchangeable when used with regard 
to them. They transform, moreover, becoming other than what have been and 
cautious scrutiny discloses not immediate and infrequent transformation in 
them, but a frequent modification which appears remarkable only after it has 
disappeared on for some time. There is then an embedded tendency towards 
disparity in them, an impatient vital power which does not stay for an impulse 
from without to come into action. It is rajas, which means suitably dust and is 
used to articulate variability because the constant mutation of objects obscures 
their authentic nature. This mutation encounters, on the other hand, interior 
resistance which causes a slowing down of the process and even evident 
pauses, as is obvious from the presence of more or less stable objects in the 
world. Hence there is a third element, a principle of obstruction alongside of 
perceptibility and mutability. It is tamas in Samkhya discourses because it 
obscures manifestation and inhibits movement (Ghosh, 1997). 
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According to the Samkhya system, the state of equilibrium of sattva, rajas and 
tamas is called prakrti (Sharma, 2006). The development of prakrti arises by 
means of these three constituent powers or gunas, which are postulated in view 
of the nature of the effects of prakrti. Prakrti is a cord of three strands. Buddhi, 
which is an effect, has the properties of pleasure, pain and bewilderment and so 
its cause, prakrti, must have answering properties. The gunas are not perceived, 
but are inferred from their effects (Radhakrishnan, 1923, Vol.2). Because there 
is an important identity (tadatmya) among the effect and its cause, we 
recognize the nature of the gunas from the nature of their products. All objects 
of the world, from the intellect down to the ordinary objects of perception (for 
instance, table, pots, etc.), are found to possess three characters able to 
producing pleasure, pain and indifference respectively. The same things are 
enjoyable to some individual, painful to another and neutral to a third. The 
cuckoo's cry is a pleasure to the artist, a pain to his sick friend and neither to 
the plain rustic. A rose enchantments the young, dejects the dying man and 
leaves the gardener cold and indifferent. Victory in war elates the victor, 
depresses the vanquished and leaves the third party rather indifferent. Now as 
the cause must hold what is in the effect, we can infer that the ultimate cause of 
things must have been constituted also by three gunas (Chatterjee and Datta, 
2007). The three gunas are never separate. They hold up one another and 
interact with one another. They are closely associated as the flame, the oil and 
the wick of a lamp. They constitute the very substance of prakrti 
(Radhakrishnan, 1923, Vol.2). Subsequently, they are not mechanically placed 
together, but reciprocally engross one another and form a unity in trinity. In 
other words, they do not only co-exist but also stick together. This inherent 
interdependence of the gunas excludes the opportunity of the breaking up of 
prakrti by their departure (Hiriyanna, 1949). All the objects are composed of 
the three gunas and the differences of the world are traced to the predominance 
of the different gunas. The foundation of this notion is certainly psychological, 
as the types of feeling tone are made the origin of the difference, but even so 
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early as the era of the Samkhya Karika the gunas are signified factors or 
constituents of prakrti, since prakrti alone is substantive and gunas are only 
elements in it. They may be regarded as signifying the different stages of the 
evolution of any particular product (Radhakrishnan, 1923, Vol.2). Accordingly, 
the electron of modem science bears some similarity with the gunas of 
Samkhya philosophy. Both are infra-atomic. The former constitutes a unit 
negative charge having inertia. The later also constitutes mass charged with 
energy. But the grave divergence lies in the fact that the former is capable of 
segregation as in cathode rays, while the later can never be separated 
(Chakravarti, 1951). 
Gunas and Prakrti: A Relationship: 
I found a universal accord prevails amid thinkers of past and present, that the 
gunas are not the adjectival qualities of prakrti, but are the very constituents of 
prakrti (Rao, April 1963). Thus Hiriyanna (1949) says, that prakrti is the first 
cause of the universe, is therefore solitary and complex; and its complexity is 
the result of its being constituted of three factors, each of which is explained as 
a guna. By the word guna here we should not comprehend what it is generally 
taken to mean, viz., a 'quality'. It means here rather a 'component factor' or a 
'constituent' of prakrti. But it should not be regarded as built up out of them, 
for while it depends on them they depend just as much on it, both being equally 
beginning-less. This inherent interdependence of the gunas excludes the 
possibility of the contravention of prakrti by their separation. Though such 
intricate descriptions are met with in dialogues on the nature of the relationship 
of the gunas with prakrti, and however the reprimand is well given that the 
relationship is not one of 'a sum total of its parts', still we are not sure whether 
we can consider it as 'more than the sum total of the parts'. Somehow, the 
words 'component factor' and 'constituent' fail to induce and do not go beyond 
suggesting that prakrti is composed of gunas as the 'ingredient elements' (Rao, 
April 1963). If prakrti is not the 'sum total of the gunas', in what manner can 
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we call it 'more than the sum total', if we are to regard it as a 'whole', maybe 
the English linguistic medium is insufficient to differentiate the technical 
relationship between the gunas and prakrti. It is accepted here that somehow 
the use of the words 'constituent' and 'component' entail the concept of 'a part 
and a whole', which is accurately the meaning we should evade, when we think 
the gunas as forming prakrti (Dasgupta, 1922, Vol.1). It is the relationship 
neither of the 'sum total of the parts' nor of 'more than the sum total of the 
parts', but of an absolute identity. Gunas are themselves prakrti. As 
Mahadevan, in his Samkhyasutravrttisara, says that, the prakrti is not the 
receptacle of the gunas, but is itself the gunas. He basis his analysis upon the 
sutra; 'because it is of the nature of sattva and others. That is to say, prakrti is 
not to be taken as 'constituted of the elements' of sattva, rajas, and tamas as the 
'ingredients'. As even the Samkhya Karika says, 'prakrti is the opposite of 
anything made up of parts' (Rao, April 1963). It is clear from this that prakrti is 
to be taken as being itself sattva, itself rajas, and itself tamas (Garbe, 1892) and 
(Dvivedin, 1981). Prakrti is an inseparable entity identical with itself. It may be 
asked, then, what purpose is served by introducing the idea of the gunas, other 
than to obscure the concept of prakrti. To this, the Samkhya Karika replies; 
'prakrti works through them' (avyaktam pravartate trigunatah)'. And, 
consequently, it may be said that, according to the Samkliya conception, the 
gunas are the 'functional modes' of prakrti, the ways which prakiti takes to 
manifest itself. Also according to the Samkhya premises, prakrti is the name for 
gunas, and it is prakrti which manifests in the form of the universe (Rao, April 
1963). 
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Transformation: 
Gunas are said to be ever changing. They cannot stay motionless even for an 
instant because of distortion which is their nature. Transformation is said to be 
of two types; (I) homogeneous or svarupa-parinama and (II) heterogeneous or 
virupa-parinama (Sharma, 1960). In the state of dissolution, every element is 
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pinched into itself, away from its other counterparts and becomes constant. It is 
changed into the homogeneous. In this way, sattva changes into sattva, rajas 
into rajas and tamas into tamas. This transformation is called sarupa-parinama 
or homogeneous transformation. Being each by itself, none of the gunas can do 
anything. This state of equilibrium exists before creation. In this state of 
equilibrium, the gunas exist in the shape of un-manifest groups in which there 
is not transformation, no object and none of the qualities such as sound, touch, 
form, taste and smell. This is the prakrti of Samkhya. In creation and till the 
stage of dissolution sets in, the gunas are in a state of constant fluctuation and 
each tries to dominate the others. It is this fluctuation of gunas that results in 
the creation of various objects. This type of transformation is called virupa-
parinama or heterogeneous transformation. This causes creation (Sharma, 
2006), and it is the starting point of the world's evolution (Chatterjee and 
Datta, 2007). 
When the three gunas, i.e., sattva, rajas and tamas are of equal force, they are in 
a state of stress and evolution (srsti) does not take place. It is only when their 
equilibrium is disturbed that the process of evolution begins. But nevertheless, 
even when there is no evolution, prakrti is not motionless (Mahadevan. 1974). 
Thus then gunas are the heterogeneous modes of working, through which the 
single prakrti maintains itself as the object of a knowing subject. By means of 
these, prakrti: 
(A) Exists (Sattva), (B) Existing, it changes (rajas) and (C) Yet, it restrains 
itself (tamas) (Seal, 1915). The last one is the principle of identity, which 
preserves the important nature of prakrti and its recognition through its 
changing processes of evolution (Rao, April 1963). 
Evolution: 
With the evolution, there are associated an amount of teachings or theories 
which have an inner relationship with it and which consequently must have 
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unavoidably the same source. They are the ideas of primal matter (prakrti), the 
theory of the three gunas of the primal matter, and the theory of twenty-five 
principles or entities. They have engraved upon the Samkhya philosophy their 
vital characteristics and their introduction indicates a most perceptive 
transformation which the system undergoes in the development of its long 
history (Frauwallner, 1973, Vol.1). The Samkhyites are 'evolutionists' 
(parinamavadins), and so, sattva, rajas, and tamas are characteristics logically 
deduced from the parinamavada (evolutionary theory), which conceives of 
prakrti as 'parinamini'. The ontological nature of the gunas as 'reals' is obvious 
from the way they are conceived of as 'forces' of prakrti, not as 'attributes' of 
prakrti (Rao, April 1963). Evolution (tattvantaraparinama) in Samkhya means 
the development of categories of existence and not mere changes of qualities of 
substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental) (Dasgupta, 1922, Vol.1). 
Evolution means transformation in form (parinama), a conception which is 
unknown to Nyaya-Vaisesika and not changes of place (parispanda) which is 
what the latter mean by 'action' (karma). A plant, for instance, may be shifted 
from one place to another; but it may also grow or shrivel where it is. The 
transformation, though, as conceived here, is not in one direction alone. The 
evolutionary process is periodical and every period of evolution (srsti) is 
followed by a period of dissolution (pralaya) when the entire diversity of the 
universe becomes dormant or goes to sleep, as it were, in prakrti. Cycle thus 
follows cycle and as in many other Indian doctrines, it is thought here that this 
sequence had no beginning and is not going to have an end. But even in the 
stage of dissolution, we must bear in mind, prakrti does not cease to be 
dynamic, motion being conceived as original to it; only its component parts, the 
gunas, continually reproduces themselves then instead of acting on one another 
and giving rise to a heterogeneous transformation (Hiriyanna, 1949). It is only 
when heterogeneous transformation takes place and rajas, vibrates and makes 
sattva and tamas vibrate that the equilibrium is disturbed and evolution takes 
place. Sattva, the principle of manifestation and rajas, the principle of activity 
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were properly held in check by tamas, the principle of non-manifestation and 
non-activity. But when rajas, the principle of activity vibrates and makes the 
other two vibrate, the process of creation begins. And creation is not the new 
creation of the worldly objects, but merely their manifestation. It is only 
making explicit of that which was formerly implicit. Evolution is again said to 
be teleological and not mechanical or canopy (Sharma, 1960). Prakrti evolves 
the world of objects when it comes into contact with a purusa. The evolution of 
the world has its starting point in the contact (Samyoga) among purusa and 
prakrti. The contact among purusa and prakrti does not, although; mean any 
type of ordinary combination like that amid two finite material substances. It is 
a kind of effective relation through which prakrti is influenced by the presence 
of purusa in the same way in which our body is sometimes moved by the 
presence of a thought. There can be no evolution unless the two become 
somehow associated with each other. The evolution of the world cannot be due 
to the self alone, for it is motionless; nor can it be due to matter alone, for it is 
non-intelligent. The activity of prakrti must be guided by the intelligence of 
purusa, if there is to be any evolution of the world. It is simply when purusa 
and prakrti co-operate that there is the creation of a world of objects but the 
question is how can two such dissimilar and opposite principles like purusa and 
prakrti co-operate? What brings the one in contact with the other (Chatterjee 
and Datta, 2007)? In explaining this contradiction, Samkhya employs the 
typical example of the blind man and the lame man. The blmd man and the 
lame man co-operated with each other to flee from fire. The lame man climbed 
on the shoulders of the blind man and directed him along the correct path. In 
this way both of them reached a secure and desired spot (Sharma, 2006) In 
much the same way, the non-intelligent prakrti and the motionless purusa unite 
and co-operate to serve their respective interests. Prakrti requires the presence 
of purusa in order to be identified or appreciated by someone (darsanartham) 
and purusa requires the assistance of prakrti in order to distinguish itself from 
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the latter and there by achieve liberation (Kaivalyartham) (Chatterjee and 
Datta, 2007). 
E volutes: 
There is a gradual demarcation and integration of the three gunas and as a 
consequence of their amalgamation in diverse proportions, the different objects 
of the world originates (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). The saint Kapila has 
explained the order of creation, as follows: 
1. Mahat: The first distortion in evolution is mahat or mahana (great). Along 
with intellect, ego and mind it is the cause of the whole creation. Mahat is the 
cosmic aspect of intellect and intellect in the entities is the psychological aspect 
of mahat. Mahat is both eternal and non-eternal. Vijnanabhiksu has established 
samskaras in buddhi or intellect. The special functions of buddhi or intellect are 
judgment and memory and it is a means of distinguishing among the knower 
and the known. It is by means of intellect that decision is given in any matter. 
Intellect has its basis in the profusion of sattva element. Its natural purpose is to 
manifest itself and other objects. With the increase in the sattva element, 
intellect gains in virtue, knowledge, aloofness and distinction. If the tamas 
element increases, it is noticeable by such attributes as vice (adharma), 
ignorance (ajnana) and attachment (asakti). The characteristics of sattva 
elements are the proper qualities of the buddhi. Purusa may comprehend the 
difference that exists among him-self and prakrti, and may subsequently think 
and examine its own real nature. In this manner, buddhi differs from soul or 
atman. The soul is above all physical substances and qualities. Intellect is the 
basis of the activities of the jivatma or the living being. When the element of 
sattva increases in the intellect, the reflection of the soul falls on it and 
enlightens it. The activities of the sense organs and the mind are for serving the 




2. Ahamkara: Mahat produces ahamkara. It is the principle of individuation. 
Its function is to create self-sense (abhimana). It produces the idea of the T 
and the 'mine'. It is the entity ego-sense. Purusa erroneously recognizes 
himself with this ego and knows himself as the agent of action, desirer of 
desires and strivers for ends and holder and enjoyer of ideas, emotions and 
volitions and also of material objects (Sharma, 1960). Radhakrishnan (1923, 
Vol.2) states that the gunas take three diverse courses of development from 
ahamkara, are as under: 
(I) Vaikarika or Sattvika: When sattva predominates. Viewed as cosmic, it 
produces manas and five sensory organs and five motor organs. Viewed as 
psychological, it produces fine conduct. 
(II) Bhutadi or Tamasa: When tamas predominates. Viewed as cosmic, it 
produces the five subtle elements (tanmatras). Viewed as psychological, it 
leads to apathetic acts or to indolence and sloth. 
(III) Taijasa or Rajasa: When rajas, predominates. Viewed as cosmic, it 
supplies the energy by which the sattvika and the tamasa create their respective 
evolutes. Viewed as psychological, it produces evil conduct (Sharma, 1960). 
The order of evolution originating in ahamkara is given in the Samkhya Karika. 
It is accepted by Vacaspati Misra. But in Samkhyapravachanbhasya, 
Vijnanabhiksu has accepted mind or manas as the only sense organs in which 
the sattva ahamkara originates, although the five tanmatras or subtle elements 
have their source in the tamas ahamkara (Sharma, 2006). 
3. Manas or Mind: Manas is the internal organ which has the significant 
functions of synthesising the sense data into percept, suggesting substitute 
courses of action and carrying out the decrees of the will through the organs of 
action. At the same time as in the case of the intellect and the self sense, so also 
in the case of manas no difference is made among the organs and its functions. 
Manas is said to be the concierge, while the senses are regarded as the doors. 
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The co-operation of manas is essential for both perception and action. It 
assumes various forms in association with different senses (Radhakrishnan, 
1923, Vol.2). The organs of perception (jnanendriyas) and the organs of action 
(karmendriyas) are exterior tools. Mind, ego and intellect are the three internal 
organs. The imperative processes are the functions of the internal organs. These 
internal organs are influenced by the exterior organs. Perception by the sense 
organs is of an indiscriminate or indeterminate nature and it is given a 
determinate form by the mind after it has determined the nature of perception. 
The ahamkara takes command of the perceptions and likes or dislikes them, 
according as they are useful or not useful for the attainment of its purpose, 
though the intellect decides whether these objects are to be adopted or 
discarded. The three internal organs along with the ten external organs are 
called the thirteen karana organs. The external organs uphold contact only with 
objects that are present. But the internal organs can be conscious of objects 
belonging to the past, the present and the future. 
4. Five Sense Organs: The five senses or jnanendriyas are skin, nose, eyes, 
ears and tongue. In fact, sense is an indiscernible energy or force which exists 
in the perceived organs and apprehends the objects. In this manner 
subsequently, the sense is not the eye but its power of visual perception. The 
senses are not perceptible. They are inferred from the functions that they 
execute. The five organs acquire and produce knowledge of touch, smell, 
colour, sound and taste. All these are bom because of purusa and are the result 
of the ahamkara. 
5. Five Motor Organs: The cause of the creation of objects and the organs of 
action (motor organs) and perception is the need of purusa for experience. The 
five organs of action (karmendriyas) are; mouth, hands, feet, anus and the sex 
organs. They execute, speech, hearing, movement, excretion and reproduction 
functions respectively (Sharma, 2006). 
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6. Tanmatras: The five tanmatras are the potential elements or general essence 
of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. These are very subtle and cannot be 
normally perceived. We recognize them by inference, however the yogis and 
saints may have a perception of them (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). 
7. Mahabhutas; The five mahabhutas or physical elements instigate in the five 
subtle elements in the following way (Sharma, 2006): 
a) From the essence of sound (sabdatanmatra) is created akasa with the 
quality of sound which is perceived by the ear. 
b) From the essence of touch (sparsatanmatra) united with that of sound, 
arises air with the attributes of sound and touch. 
c) Out of the essence of colour (rupatanmatra) as assorted with those of 
sound and touch, there arises fire or light with the properties of sound, 
touch and colour. 
d) From the essence of taste (rasatanmatra) united with those of sound, 
touch and colour is created the element of water with the qualities of 
sound, touch, colour and taste. 
e) The essence of smell (gandhatanmatra) united with the other four gives 
rise to earth which has all the five qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste 
and smell. The five physical elements of akasa, air, fire, water and earth 
have respectively the definite properties of sound, touch, colour, taste 
and smell. In the order in which they occur here, the subsequent element 
has the special qualities of the preceding ones added to its own, because 
their essences go on combining increasingly (Chatterjee and Datta, 
2007). 
The process of evolution according to the Samkhya philosophy (I have already 
pointed out) may be illustrated in figure 'A'. 
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Each evolute is better than the one following it and grosser than the one 
foregoing it. The series from prakrti to the five gross elements numbers twenty-
four and purusa is said to be the twenty-fifth principle of the Samkhya 
philosophy. The twenty-three principles derived from prakrti are effects, as 
they are dissimilar from prakrti and purusa, are of imperfect extent, and possess 
the attributes of pradhana, such as growth and absorption, and serve as 
instruments of purusa. All the objectss of the world are said to be the vikrtis of 
prakrti. Prakrti stands to vikrtis in the relation of an original substance to its 
modification (Radhakrishnan, 1923, Vol.2). The purusa is neither a cause nor 
an effect, prakrti is only the cause and not the effect; mahat, ahamkara and the 
five subtle essences are both causes and effects; although the five sensory and 
the five motor organs and the five gross elements and manas are effects only 
(Sharma, 1960). 
Stages of Evolution: 
The entire course of evolution from prakrti to the gross physical elements is 
distinguished into two stages, namely; (I) Psychical (pratyayasarga or 
buddhisarga) and (II) Physical (tanmatrasarga or bhautikasarga) (Chatterjee and 
Datta, 2007). The psychical evolutes are; mind or manas, the five cognitive 
sense organs (jnanendriyas), viz.; the sense of hearing, touch, sight, taste and 
smell and the five conative sense organs (karmendriyas), viz.; the sense of 
speech, hearing, movement, excretion and reproduction. The physical evolutes 
are; the five subtle essences called tanmatras, viz.; the essences of sound, 
touch, colour, taste and smell and the five gross elements (mahabhutas) which 
appears from the essences, viz.; ether, air, fire, water and earth (Mahadevan, 
1974). The psychical includes the progress of prakrti as buddhi, ahamkara and 
the eleven sense-motor organs. The physical is constituted by the evolution of 
the five subtle physical essences (tanmatra), the gross elements (mahabhuta) 
and the products. The tanmatras, being super sensible and un-enjoyable to 
common beings are called avisesa that is devoid of definite perceptible 
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characters. The physical elements and their products, being obsessed of definite 
characters, enjoyable or painful or amazing are designated as visesa or the 
specific. The visesas or specific objects are divided into three types, namely; 
the gross elements, the gross body bom of parents and the subtle body. The 
gross body is composed of the five gross elements, though some thing that it is 
made of four elements or of merely one element. The subtle body is the 
mixture of buddhi, ahamkara, the eleven sense-motor organs and the five subtle 
elements (tanmatra). The gross body is the support of the subtle body, in so far 
as the buddhi, ahamkara and the senses cannot function without some physical 
origin (Chatterjee and Datta, 2007). Vacaspati Misra has accepted the existence 
of these two bodies, the subtle and the gross, but Vijnanabhiksu has postulated 
a third type of body called the adhisthan sharira, which serves as an 
intermediate for the transfer of the subtle body from one gross body to another 
gross body (Sharma, 2006). In consequence each of the stage of evolution 
remains as an enduring category of being, and offers scope to the more and 
more differentiated and logical groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus it is 
said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a demarcation of new stages as 
incorporated in preceding stages (samsrstaviveka) (Dasgupta, 1922, Vol. I). 
Therefore, the evolution of the Samkhya is not the mere permutation of atoms. 
It is a teleological evolution. In a tortuous way, every object in the world gives 
credibility to the purpose of the soul or self Just as tree bears fruits, or water 
flows because the gradient in the earth's surface, or the pieces of iron are 
attracted towards the magnet, or milk flows from the udder of the cow for the 
nourishment of its calf, thus in the same way every object indirectly fulfils the 
purpose of the purusa, be it liberation or be it experience. Prakrti helps the 
purusa. Although purusa is motionless, apathetic and incompetent the 
compassionate prakrti, maintaining indifference, works constantly towards the 
objective of the purusa. Prakrti works for the liberation of the purusa. Even 
though Samkhya has postulated prakrti as the material as well as the efficient 
cause while the purusa is neither a cause nor an effect, however instead of 
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prakrti, it is purusa that should be considered the efficient and uhimate cause of 
evolution (Sharma, 2006). The gunas, which mutually differ and yet always co-
operate, work like the oil, wick and flame of a lamp and illuminate the 
complete purpose of the purusa and present it to the buddhi or the intellect. All 
the organs work for the realization of the purusa's end and for no other end. 
The subtle body too works for the sake of the purusa's end. Hence the entire 
creation unconsciously tends towards the realization of the purpose of the 
purusa. And creation will carry on till all the purusas are liberated. The intact 
evolution of prakrti, thus, right from the first evolute, the mahat, up to the last 
evolutes, the gross elements, is for the purpose of liberating each individual 
purusa (Sharma, 1960). 




Now I proceed to present a critical assessment of the Samkhya philosophy in 
general and their theory of gunas in particular. No doubt, Samkhya system of 
thought is one of the oldest, but its origin has for long been a matter of 
controversy. Because some scholars, both old and new, describe it as derived 
from the Upanishads; but others maintain that it is an independent doctrine. 
Throughout the Vedic era, from the speculative hymns of the Rig-Veda and 
Atharvaveda up to the earliest Upanishads {Brhadaranyaka-Upanishads and 
Chandogya-Upanishads etc.), the Samkhya system never appears as a logical 
philosophy. Even its name is not known. However, an amount of concepts and 
trends of speculation commence to emerge which will later be included into the 
ultimate form of the doctrine. Even though, the argumentations in the Samkhya 
Karika are not always entirely clear and logical. This may be due to various 
authors having interpolated some verses of their own into Isvarakrsna's original 
work. 
Much of the Samkhya literature appears to have been lost and there seems to be 
no continuity of tradition from ancient era up to the age of the commentators. 
But the existing part of Samkhya literature also is comparatively poor. 
Consequently, the complexity presents itself mainly with regard to its 
chronology. The excessive weighting however, of noticeable similarities is not 
simply detected when the subject is discussed in a foreign language. 
The logic of the Samkhya system, similar to Jainism, forces it to hold idealistic 
monism or absolutism but it adheres, like Jainism, to spiritualistic pluralism 
and dualistic realism. Accordingly, the basic gaffe of the Samkhya 
philosophers is to treat prakrti as absolute and independent but it does not 
emerge to be so from the account given of it in the Samkhya texts. It has three 
attributes and hence the attribute less self is separate from it. Prakrti is 
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dependent upon the purusa. Without the influence of the purusa, prakrti cannot 
evolve the universe, even though that influence may consist in mere proximity. 
The prakrti creates and evolves only for the purusa. When the purusa comes to 
recognize it, the prakrti disappears. In this manner, it is better to rename prakrti 
as ignorance or absence of knowledge. It cannot be absolute and independent. 
The next gaffe made by the Samkhya philosophers that the prakrti has been 
characterized as personal by them. There are numerous sentences scattered 
about in texts of Samkhya philosophy showing prakrti to be personal. For 
example, she is like a dancer. She is like a woman. She has superlative 
qualities. She is compassionate and serves the purusa with aloofness. 
Therefore, she is entirely altmistic. She is very subtle and retreating and cannot 
stand the gaze of the purusa. She has the colours of the rainbow and 
endeavours to attract the purusa. In this manner, prakrti reflects the personality 
of a woman and consequently cannot be the first cause of the universe. 
Furthermore, the Samkhyites description of prakrti makes it a mere abstraction, 
a bareness of pure objects. The original state of prakrti is no harmony, but 
merely a stress of the three gunas. The gunas point to a state beyond them. It is 
this state which gives harmony to the gunas and transcends them. Prakrti does 
not do that. Hence it is not real. 
Samkhya has timely and again bewildered the worldly being with the 
unqualified witness or purusa. Samkhya has given abundant evidence of the 
truly spiritual attitude in explaining the soul as pure consciousness, as the basic 
of knowledge, as other than the three gunas, as witness, as inactive, as self-
evident, an imperceptible and absolute. But the proofs it has adduced to prove 
the existence of the purusa are applied to the practical, psychological being and 
not to the spiritual soul. How can the spiritual self be many and the beneficiary 
of experience? If the true existences of the universe as well as the eternally 
independent and free nature of the soul have to be postulated concurrently, then 
in fact, two types of purusas, the transcendental and the empirical, will have to 
be postulated. 
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By utilizing the typical example of the blind and the lame, the Samkhya has 
tried to establish some relation among the prakrti and the purusa, concurrently 
maintaining their dualism intact. According to the Samkhya philosophy, just as 
the tree bears fruits, or water flows because of the slope of surface, or the 
pieces of iron are attracted by the magnet or milk flows from the udders of the 
cow for nourishment of its young calf, likewise prakrti evolves for the purusa. 
But the arguments put forward by the Samkhyites are not logical. Not one of 
the examples given above correctly fits it with or illustrates the relation among 
the prakrti and the purusa. Samkhya has remarks perfectly that purusa being 
inactive and prakrti being unconscious; no third element can bring about any 
conjunction amid them. Actually, both prakrti and purusa appears to be 
abstractions taken from the concrete reality. For purposes of intellectual 
consideration, it is acceptable to separate purusa and prakrti, the conscious and 
the material elements. But in doing this, sight should not be lost of the fact that 
this division is simply for the purpose and facility of thought and in the real 
sense there is only one absolute and eternal reality. In this manner, the dualism 
of Samkhya is only imaginary and in philosophy it cannot be accepted as the 
ultimate truth. 
The following objections have been levelled at the relation amid prakrti and 
purusa: 
(1) The reason behind the relation among prakrti and pumsa is insufficient. If 
this purpose is liberation, then there should be no creation after dissolution. For 
both liberation and experience to be the purpose concurrently is contradictory. 
And if neither of the two is the purpose, then what is the purpose? 
(2) Not a sole example adduced by the Samkhya philosophy obviously depicts 
the nature of the relation among prakrti and purusa. The example of the lame 
man and the blind man is inappropriate because in that case both the lame man 
and the blind man are conscious. The example of iron and magnet is also 
erroneous because if prakrti is attracted to the purusa by the mere fact of its 
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proximity, then dissolution can never take place and so liberation will be not 
possible. For, in that case, who will detach prakrti from purusa? The state of 
equilibrium of prakrti will also not be achieved. In this manner in Samkhya 
philosophy neither is the relation amid purusa and prakrti elucidated nor does 
their manifestation to be any cause of this relation. In fact, any relation among 
the two can be recognized merely when the two are regarded as two forms of 
one ultimate element. The dualism of Samkhya can be appropriate only in a 
monistic background. 
The following chief arguments have been advanced by different critics against 
the Samkhya theory of evolution: 
(a) There are no logical foundations for the order of distortions of prakrti. 
Manifestation of their distortions of prakrti in the definite order, Samkhya does 
not emerge to be supported either by logical or metaphysical necessity. 
(b) Another gaffe made by the Samkhya philosophers, according to Dr. 
Radhakrishnan, S., the Samkhya has mixed up its spiritual or intellectual 
metaphysics with psychological facts. It has mixed up its own statements with 
the thoughts borrowed from the Upanishads. Hence, the evolutionism of 
Samkliya is not ample and logical. Consequently, realizing these serious faults, 
the commentators like Vacaspati Misra, Gaudapada and Vijnanabhiksu have 
maintained the reality of one purusa only. If Samkhya can diminish all objects 
to one prakrti, why can it not reduced all the empirical souls to one purusa by 
the similar logic? And why can prakrti and the empirical purusa are not 
reduced to the absolute purusa by the same logic? Again, if all the purusas are 
basically alike, if the essence of all is pure consciousness, how can they be 
really many? Distinctions and differences constitute individuality. If all the 
purusas are fundamentally the identical, there is no sense in proclaiming their 
quantitative plurality. Numerical pluralism is utter baloney. 
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Furthermore, another grave defect in Samkhya is in its conception of liberation. 
Liberation is regarded as a pessimistic cessation of the three types of pain and 
not as a state of affirmative bliss. Samkhya experiences that the bliss is a 
product of sattva guna and xannot remain in liberation which is the state 
beyond the gunas. But Samkhya forgets that the bliss in liberation is not 
empirical happiness produced by the sattva. This bliss is also transcendental in 
character. It is beyond both pain and pleasure. What is related to pain is 
empirical pleasure and not transcendental bliss. The following are some 
objection raised against the Samkhya concept of liberation: 
(I) If the purusa is the agent as well as the one who experiences, then how is it 
free by nature? And if the evolution of prakrti takes place in order to attain its 
liberation, then how is it eternally free? 
(II) According to Samkhya philosophy there is no happiness in liberation. The 
Samkhyites have thus bewildered happiness with pleasure. 
(III) According to Prasastapada, how can prakrti come to recognize that the 
purusa has known it? If prakrti is by nature is dynamic then how will it remain 
inactive in a state of liberation? If there can be no obliteration of an object then 
how can ignorance be shattered? Actually the Samkhya notion of liberation fits 
better into the background of Advaita Vedanta than that of Samkhya itself. 
Hence, Samkhya realizes the gaffes, but in order to shield the initial mistakes it 
perpetrates blunders after blunders. 
Conclusion: 
The Samkhya system is one of the oldest systems of Indian philosophy based 
on logical, rational and realistic approach. Its principles are founded in 
numerous Upanishads such as Chandogya, Prasna, and Katha and especially 
in Svetasvatar Upanishad. Samkhya viewpoint has also got reflected later in 
the Mahabharata and in the Bhagavad-Gita. Samkhya is said to have been 
founded by Maharishi Kapila. Samkhyaptavacanasutra is the chief sacred book 
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of this sect. It is thought to be written by Kapila. And Samkhya Karika of 
Isvarakrsna is the earliest existing as well as the most popular textbook of this 
school. And later on various commentators wrote commentaries on it. 
Consequently, from initial times, Samkhya philosophy understood the basic 
problems of human life; that the mind turns one's bliss into misery by its 
projections, preoccupations, and identifications with non-eternal things. 
Samkhya believes in the existence of twenty-five elements. These are also 
called as twenty-five categories of the Samkhya system. These are grouped in 
viz.; non-living prakrti and living purusa. The Samkhya may be called a 
philosophy of dualistic realism. It traces the entire course of the world to the 
interaction of two ultimate principles, viz.; prakrti (matter) and purusa (spirit). 
On the one hand, we have prakrti which is regarded as the ultimate cause of the 
world of objects including physical things, organic bodies and psychical 
products like the mind, the intellect and the ego. Prakrti is both the material and 
the efficient cause of the world. It is active and ever changing, but unsighted 
and unintelligent. While, on the other hand, the Samkhya admits another 
ultimate principle purusa (spirit). The category of the purusa includes a 
plurality of selves who are eternal and irretrievable principles of pure 
consciousness. The selves are intelligent but inactive and static. It is in contact 
with such conscious and intelligent selves that the unconscious and 
unintelligent prakrti evolves the world of experience. Prakrti is neither atomic 
substance nor consciousness, but it possesses the three gunas of sattva, rajas 
and tama. They are called gunas (that is ropes) because they are intertwined. 
According to Samkhya philosophy, sattva, rajas and tamas are the root causes 
from which the whole universe is originate. The state in which they are in their 
natural equilibrium is called prakrti, and when their balance is disturbed, they 
are said to be in vikrti, the heterogeneous state. The three gunas are said to be 
the ultimate cause of all creation. These gunas continually transform their 
predominance over one another. It is through their constant interaction that the 
flow of cosmic and individual life continues. They are essentially diverse from 
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but unified with one another. Just as the oil, wick and flame of a lamp work 
together to produce light, so the different gunas co-operate to create the objects 
of the world. The gunas work within an entities in the same way. The gunas are 
continually changing into one another. Finally they come into a state of perfect 
balance of prakrti. This state can't be observed, merely inferred. 
The Mahabharata also presupposes the doctrine of the gunas. As I have 
previously mentioned that, the constituents of prakrti are the three qualities of 
sattva (goodness), rajas (passion) and tamas (darkness). They are present 
throughout all things, though in different degrees. Beings are classified into 
gods, man and beasts, according as the one or the other quality predominate. 
These three are the shackles of the soul. They are seen mixed up. They are 
attached to one another and likewise follow one another. There is no doubt of 
this that as long as there is goodness (sattva), so long darkness (tamas) exists. 
As long as goodness and darkness exists, so long is passion (rajas) said to exist. 
They execute their journey together in union and move about collectively. 
Nilakantha, commenting on this, observes; however, much sattva may be 
increased, it is still held in check by the tamas, and thus there is the constant 
relation of that which checks and that which is checked among the three gunas. 
They exist together though changing in strength. Tamas is the quality of inertia, 
or in man, the spirit trance. It aims at the contentment of the senses. Its end is 
bliss. Its character is ignorance. If it is controlled, the man is said to be 
temperate. Rajas, is the emotional energy exhilarating desires. It makes man 
fidgety and long for success and power; when subdues, it has its gentle side of 
affection, sympathy, love. It is intermediate amid tamas, which leads to 
ignorance and falsehood, and sattva, which develops insight into reality. Sattva 
is the intelligent side of man. It promotes steadiness of character and fosters 
goodness. It alone is capable to guide man aright. Its virtue is realistic wisdom; 
its end is true recital of duty. No man is devoid of these gunas. The three gunas 
have their brawny grip comparatively in mind, life and body. Tamas or the 
principle of inertia is strongest in our material nature or physical being, rajas in 
lOi.) 
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our imperative nature, which works against the physical, sattva in our mental 
nature. Strictly speaking, that they are present in mixed form in every yam of 
our psychical makeup. Taking up the volitional side of conscious life, tamas 
element predominates in our lower desires, with their incessant reappearance of 
requirements and satisfactions. The tamas element prevails in our desires, 
authority and profit, for achievement and escapade the element of sattva aims 
at a content balance or adjustment of self to environment and an interior 
accord. These three by their interplay determine the man's nature and 
temperament. All individual souls consequently are grouped into inert, fidgety 
and good. The gunas are the vital powers of the celestial, which do not simply 
exist in perfect equilibrium quietude, but also in divine action. The tamas in 
god is a tranquil subduing all actions, the rajas is his will competent of 
effectual and blissful deeds, and the sattva is the self existent light of the divine 
being. 
The theory of gunas is also directly associated with the concept of 
satkaryavada. Even if we presuppose that the effect is really identical with the 
cause, at least one factor must be introduced to account for the realistic 
distinction of clay and jar, threads and cloth etc. This factor is constituted by 
the chord of the gunas, the varying repartitions of which, through the 
innumerable products of nature, will account for the entire multiplicity of 
things. At the same time, though, the gunas cannot be considered to be purely 
objective constituents of nature. They all three have a psychological 
dimensions besides their physical one. As I have already stated that, sattva 
refers to vivacity of mind, lucidity of thought, pleasure etc., as well as to 
buoyancy and transparency etc. Tamas means darkness, inertia, but also 
sluggishness and despondency. Rajas, is movement and activity, tempest and 
passion etc. Furthermore, it seems that the prevalence of this or that guna in a 
meticulous object depends upon the mental dispositions of the individual 
approaching that object. That is why it is stated in Karika-12 that they 
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interrelate with one another. The Gaudapadabhasya gives a pictorial 
explanation of this interaction, as given below: 
'Consequently, a gorgeous and virtuous woman is a source of pleasure to all, 
and she herself is the cause of pain to her co-wives; and again, she produces 
delusion in the zealous in this manner sattva is the cause of the existence of 
rajas and tamas. Again, just as a king, diligent in shielding his people and 
gruelling the wicked, produces pleasure in the good people, and pain and 
delusion in the wicked in this way, rajas produces sattva and tamas. In a 
comparable manner, tamas brings about the existence of sattva and rajas by its 
own nature of covering; just as the clouds, covering the sky, cause contentment 
to the world, they urge the farmer to activity by their rain, and create delusion 
in the lovers in separation.' 
Of course, this vagueness of the gunas can be historically described as the 
result of a fusion among the vertical mould of evolution and the horizontal one. 
But it also has a profound philosophical significance. On the one hand, it 
means that nature, in its developed states, can never be accounted for without 
referring to the presence of some purusa looking at it. Prior to creation, nature 
is merely the so called gunasamyavastha (the state of the equilibrium of the 
gunas), which is equivalent to in-differentiation or pandemonium. On the other 
hand, it points to the natural state of the purusa in whose opinion the gunas 
really belong to the things themselves, since he is normally incapable to 
apprehend them as projections of his own mental states. 
Hence, the three gunas which are everywhere intertwined account for all 
activities of nature. The world is a play of these modes. The diversity of 
phenomena arises through the interplay of the equilibrium, motion and inertia. 
Accordingly the gunas are bom in gunas and are dissolved in them. 
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